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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
AUSTIN RICE, 
Plain~iff and Appellant, 
vs.. 
ERMA RICE, Executrix and Trustee, In 
the matter of the Estate of David L. 
Rice, Deceased, 
·Defendant and Resp!ondent. 
INTRODUCTORY 
' 
:.l 
Case No. 
72'68 
This case has been before the court on a p·rior oc-
casion, In-re : Rice ''S Estate, Rice vs. Rice,· No. 7029 in 
this court, 182 Pac. ( 2) 111. The ease is here now on the 
appeal of the plaintiff and the cross appeal of the de-
fendant from the Findings, Conclusions and Judgment 
of the District Court of Davis County. (The testimony 
in this ease is s.ep1arately nlllnbe~red from the record, 'and 
hereinafter the record will be referred to by the letter 
' 'R' ' and the testimony by the letter '' T ''). 
At the outset it may be helpful to make a brief state-
ment ·of the issues involved which will he supported later 
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with references to the record. Austin Rice, the plaintiff 
and appellant, is the son of David L. Rice. David L. Rice 
willed to Austin ''the land now occupied by him'' at 
Farmington, U't.ah. The executrix and trustee under the 
will is the defendant, Erma Rice, daughter of David L. 
Rice, and sister of Austin. In her p1etition for distribution 
she asserted to the court that the land described by her 
therein as Austin's devise was all that was devised to 
Austin under the will, -consisting sh-e asserted of 27.71 
acres more or less. Austin contends that she omitted 
from her petition land devised to him, a;s well as water 
ap·purtenant to the land specified in th·e petition for dis-
tribution. T·he court decreed to Austin only the land, 
without water, described in the petition for distribution. 
The land involved is situated on upp;er Highway 91 in 
Farmington. The land decreed Austin is west of upper 
Highway 91 and extends west to lower Highway 91 
known respectively as No. 1 and No. 2 of Highway 91. 
The west portion of the decreed tract was deeded by 
David L. Rice years before his death to the State as a 
part of Highway 91, No. 2, and running across the de-
creed tract through the lower central p~art i~s the right 
of way of the Bamherge~r Railroad, also deeded by David 
L. Rice befo-re his death. So that actually the land de-
creed to Austin is 25 acres plus, instead of 27 acres 
plus. Across the street to the east from the decr;eed land 
are three P1lus acres with a barn on them and enclosed 
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with a fence. This land and barn were used by Austin 
during his father's lifetime and after his father's death 
for his cattle and farm implements, and these premises 
are the only ones available to Austin for these purposes. 
They were omitted from the p~etition for and decree of 
distribution. 
To the north of the decreed land and running ea:st 
and west is Davis Creek which aris~es in the mountains 
to the east of upper Highway 91. Running ·south from 
Davis Creek and paralleling at some distance east of 
the east line of upper Highway No. 91 is what is known 
as White Ditch which runs s.outh in a cement ditch, 
-
crosses west under Highway 91 through an imp·ervious 
culvert and branches off north and south to serve one 
farm north of Austin Rice and the Austin Rice prop~erty. 
Austin contends that his farm was s.erved throughout 
the years with 10 hours of water from Davis. Creek 
through the White Ditch and that they were water rights 
appurtenant to the dec~eed land which his sister, Erma., 
refused to recognize. He asked the court to decree him 
the omitted land on the east of the highway where the 
barn was located and the water rights through the White 
Ditch. The defendant at all times denie9. and she ~still 
does deny that Austin had any right to the barn prop~ 
erty or that th·ere is any water appurtenant to the decreed 
land from Davis Creek through the White Ditch. Upon 
these issues the trial court gave Austin Rice four hours 
of \va;t,er instead of the ten claimed hy him- and denied 
him th-e barn and corral prop~erty. From such a decree 
both parties have app·ealed. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 16 1944 David L. Rice of Farmington, 
' ' Utah, executed his last will and testament, (R .. 13-16). 
He died at Farmington, Utah, some ten months later, on 
F~ebruary 14, 1945, (R. 1). Apparently he wa;s ill at the 
time he made his will for i't was dictated to his attorney, 
Mr. Budge, from his sick bed, (T. 233). His will was ad-
mitted to probate April 7, 1945, (R .. 12), and on the same 
day letters testamentary were issued to the de£endant, 
Erma Rice, appointing her e:x:ecutrix of the estate, (R. 
17). On Decem beT 12, 1945, the ~exeeuirix filed her first 
and final account and petition for distribution, (R. 38-
53), and on December 26, 1945, the court entered decree 
of distribution in aecordance with the petition for dis-
tribution, (R. 58-64). 
The will, ( R. 13), provided, among other things, as 
follows: 
III. 
''I give and bequeath to my son Austin Rice 
the land, ap~proximately 27 acres in Section 31, 
Township 3 North, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meri-
dian, now occupied by him, which shall be his full 
distributive share of my estate and he shall not 
have any other or additional share or participate 
in any distribution thereof. '' 
After the above devise to the plaintiff Austin Rice 
' ' the will p:rovided for a life estate for the wife in certain 
prop·erty, a bequest of $4,000.00 to a son, L,eGrande Rice, 
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and then after the death of the wife all the remainder 
of the property to eight children exclusive of the plaintiff 
but inclusive of the defendant. So that under the will 
all that the plaintiff, Austin Rice, got was the land he 
occupied, whereas, L'eGrande got $4,000.00 plus an eighth 
of the remainder of the estate, and the defendant and her 
other brothers and sisters each got an eighth of the re-
mainder of the estate. 
It will shed some light on the intentions of the testa-
tor to examine the inventory and ap·praisement and the 
petition for distribution in order to determine what each 
heir received under the will. Therie, are two inventories, 
(R. 18-23 and R. 26-31), supplemented hy stipulation, 
(R. 35, 36), which show that the gross estate for inheri-
tance tax purposes was $41,899.70. The inventory used 
for State Inheritance Tax purpos-es shows that the land 
decreed hy the decree of distribution to Austin Rice, the 
plaintiff, (R. 60) was valued at $3,350.00 with w·ater 
rights, (R. 28, 29). It will be noted that the appraisement 
de~scribes the land with all wate~r rights pertaining there-
unto, (R. 29) ; whereas, the decree of distribution, (R. 
60), and the petition f.or distribution, (R. 41), make no 
mention of water rights. The barn and corral prop~erty 
was appraised at $170.00. (R. 29). Using the figure 
$41,899.70 as the gross ~estate for inheritance tax pur-
poses and deducting therefrom $3,350 .. 00, the value of 
Austin Rice's p1rop,erty, and the $4,000.00 decreed to 
LeGrande Rice, leaves an ·estate 'Of $34,549.70 to he~ di-
vided among the eight children exclusiv'e· of Austin Rice, 
or app~roxirnately $4,320.00 each, nearly $1,000.00 more 
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than AuHtin receiv;ed. Actually, as shown hy the p·etition 
for distribution, the total estate amounted to $52',424. 70. 
(R. 53), which after deducting Austin's and LeGrande's 
aforesaid amounts :~eft $45,000.00 or $5,632.00 each to be 
distributed to the eight children other than Austin. This 
is nearly $2,200 more for each of them than received by 
Austin if the land decreed to him ha:d carried water with 
it. The land decreed to Austin was of little value and a 
third of it of no value without water. Without water eight 
to twelve acres of th·e best land would be no good for 
farming purposes, and the remainder of it good only for 
pasture, and even the p·asture required irrigation in the 
spring, (T. 89-91). 
In the petition for distribution, (R. 40, 41), the de-
fendant advrs·ed the court that the land described therein 
was all that Austin was entitled to under the will, as fol-
lows: 
"That by said Last Will and Testament, said 
decedent devised : 
* * * * 
"(b) Unto his son, Austin Rice, as his full 
and only distributive share of said decedent's es-
tate, the following described p~roprerty located in 
Farmington, Davis County, State of Utah to-
vvit: '' (Describing the decreed land.) ' 
The decree of distribution follows the petition, (R. 
60). In neither is· there any mention of any water, nor 
of the barn and corral prop.erty. The defendant under 
oath represented to the court that the sp·ecified land 
without water was all that Austin was entitled to and 
' 
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land and 'vithout 'vater to Austin. From both inventories 
and appraisement, (R. 18 and R. 26), and from the peti-
tion for distribution, (R. 38), and the decree of distribu-
tion, (R,. 58), it appears that every p~iece of property de-
scribed in the inventories as having water rights pertain-
ing thereto was likewise described in defendant's peti-
tion for distribution, except the land decreed to Austin 
R.ice. There are nine pieces of p~roperty in the inventories 
described as having water rights including the two pieces 
decreed to Austin, but in the petition for distribution and 
the decree o~ distribution Austin's parcels are the only 
ones with the water rights omitted. All the other seven 
are deS'cribed with the water rights. In other words, the 
defendant included the water rights in all lands that came 
to her as trustee for distribution to her and the other 
children but left out any re£erence to water rights in the 
land that went to Austin, despite the fact that they were 
inventoried and the value placed up:on them with ap-
purtenant water rights. 
On October 16, 1946, (R. 65) Austin Riee p~etitioned 
the court to amend the decree of distribution to include 
his water rights and to include the land across the 
street from the decre,ed land upon which his barn and 
corrals weve located. This is. ~es'Crihed in the inventory, 
(R. 29), by two descriptions and as being worth $150.00 
and $20.00 respectively, up'on the petition for distribu-
tion and by the ·decree of ·distribution, (R. 38 and R. 63), 
this land w~as deereed to the defendant, as trustee, for t'he 
benefit of herself and the· other children-.Ja value of 
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$21.00 each ltio them, but to Austin an essenti~al ~and in-
tegral part of his fa.rm. 
Austin Rice's first petition was predicated upon the 
theory that ·the executrix occupied a fiduciary rielation-
ship to Austin and purpos·ely omitted his water rights to 
the decreed land and purposely omitted the land across 
the street upon which was. located his corral and barns, 
and that because of the fidueiary relationship he was en-
titled to have the decree amended to include the omitted 
property. 'To this p.etition ther.e was a demurrer which 
was sustained by the court, and Austin was given per-
mission to amend. He filed an amended p;etition, (R. 75). 
This petition was based upon the original theory of a 
fiduciary relationship and also upon the theory of mis-
r·epresentations. by means of which he had been deprived 
of his day in court. The demurrer was sustained to this 
petition. It was dismissed, and the ap~peal to this court 
followed with the decision now appearing at 182 Pac. 
( 2) 111, supra. 
THE TESTIMONY AT THE1 TRIAL 
In order that this Court may- clearly visualize the 
errors herein it is necessary to present the :vecord in 
some detail. 
The Abstract of Title, Exhibit "B" at Entry No. 
10, dis-closes that the deceased, David L. Rice, acquired 
three acres of the decreed p;roperty in 1909 and that 
the three acres carried with it water and water rights. 
At entry No. 17 appears the deed for 24 pJus of the 
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acres decreed to Austin and 2.10 acres across the street 
which 'vere omitted from the decree. This land was 
acquired in 1902 by David L·. Rice, together with water 
and \Vater rights. Entry No. 40 of the Abstract shows 
that David L. Rice acquired 1.75 of the acres in dispute, 
without specific mention of water rights, in 1906. En-
tries No. 43 and 46 show the deeds from David L. Rice to 
the Bamberger Railroad in 1909 and to Davis County in 
1932 for the Railroad Right of Way and Highway '91, 
No. 2, respectively. Entry No. 47 is the decree of dis'tribu-
tion to Austin showing only the land to the \Vest of 
upp~r Highway 91 without water; whereas, all of the 
decreed land had been acquired with \Vater. The plat 
in the back of the Abstract shows the decreed land to 
the \Vest of the highway with the Railroad Right-of-Way 
and the lower Highway 91 and also the land to the east 
of the highway which was omitted from the p·etition 
for and decree of distribution. Actually Austin was de-
creed only 25 acres of la~d instead of 27 acres, more or 
less, and was not decreed the land upon which his barn 
or corral were located which it is claimed he occupied 
at the time of his father's death. 
Exhibits "F" and "G" are the tax notices to 
Austin showing that the acreage in the land decreed to 
him is actually 25.24 acres and not 27.71 acres, more or 
less, as recited in the petition for distribution, (R. 41), 
and the decree of distribution, ( R. ·60). 
Exhibit "C" is a plat drawn by Clifford Hughes 
showing the lands covered by the decree of distribution 
' 
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the tax notices, and the actual survey by the fence lines. 
This ·exhibit shows that the land actually decreed to 
Austin is 2 and a fraction acres less than recited in 
the decree of distribution. 
Exhibit "D" is an exhibit showing the land to the 
east occupied by the barn and corral and is a rough 
measurement of the acreage within the fence lines. It 
shows slightly more acreage within the fence lines than 
i.s claimed by Austin and can be accounted for by the 
fact that it was only a rough survey. Mr. Hughes made 
this survey and diagram and also Exhibit ''E'' which 
roughly shows the course of Davis Creek, the White 
Ditch taking off southerly from Davis Creek, the upper 
North Ditch, and the way the White Ditch crosses the 
highway and serves the Austin Rice farm on the south 
end of it west of the highway. These Exhibits '' C '', 
"D" and "E" were testified to by Mr. Hughes at pages 
5 to 13 of the testimony. 
Mr. Hughes is secretary of Davis Creek water users, 
which is unincorporated (T. 10) and lives right south 
of the Davis Creek and his mother is the first user on 
the White Ditch. He is approximately one-half a mile 
north of .Austin Rice, so that the water runs through 
the Whit·e Ditch approximately one-half a mile in order 
to reach Austin Rice, (T. 5, 12). .After Mr. Hughes' 
mother, the first user on the White Ditch comes Clyde 
. ' 
Wilcox, Roy White, Gunder Newman, or his successor, 
then across the str.eet west of the highway and north of 
Austin Rice, Harry Kambertis, then Austin Rice south 
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of Kambertis. Formerly Lunds used the water S'outh 
of the .... \ustin Rice place, but they sold their water some 
time ago, (T. 12-13). 
David L. Rice owned 32 shares of water in the 
Davis Creek. 'The water from this creek was handled hy 
Davis Creek water users. Davis Creek water users ori-
ginated as early as 1898, and their records in 1915 show 
David Rice as owning 29 shares. He acquired three more 
after that time, making a total of 32, and at the time of 
his death he owned 32 shares, (T. 13-15). Each share of 
stock represents one hour p,er week of the use of the 
entire flow of Davis C:veek, (T. 20). The White Ditch 
\Yas cemented its full length on the east side of the high-
way in the early 1930's, after it was washed out by 
floods. The cemented ditch follows the old diteh line 
-and crosses the highway in an impervious culvert under 
the road, (T. 27). 'The David Rice family took water 
from Davis Creek both through the White Ditch to the 
south and through the North Ditch to the north. The 
only land of D·avis Rice south of Davis Creek to be 
served by the White Diteh is the Austin Rice farm, 
(T. 18, 19). 
Plaintiff's. Exhibits '' H' ', ''I'' and '' J' ', received, 
( T. 295), and defendant ':S Exhibits 2 and 3, received, 
(T. 244), ar·e five ap·plications made by David L. Rice 
for underground water claims in the State Engineer's. 
Office. Exhibit "H'' is for a well on the southeast 
corner of the decreed property commenced in 1928 and 
completed in 1928 as a supiJ~lement to a drain and as a 
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· R. ' " ater" Thi supplement to David L. 1ce s -canyon w · s 
well was never used as we shall point out later on. Ex-
hibit "I" is for a well for stock watering purposes on 
the lower part of the decr·eed land and is one of two 
wells drilled in 1934 within a few fe·et of each other for 
pasture lands. Exhibit "J" is the other of the two 
stock watering wells. Exhibit 2 is for a drain to drain 
the well shown in Exhibit ''H'' and runs from the well 
on the southeast corner of the decreed property across 
the property as will be hereinafter des-cribed. Def·end-
ant's Exhibit No. 3 is for a third stock watering well and 
was begun and completed in 1934 and is located at the 
same point and is apparently the same well as described 
in Exhibit ''I''. These Exhibits show three stock water-
ing wells on the lower part of the decreed property, all 
of them commenced and completed in 1934, a well on 
the southeast corner of the decreed prope-rty which would 
be the well near the highway, and the drain running from 
this well. It is significant to note that this well dug in 1928 
and filed on in 193'6 according to David L. Rice is to sup-
plement his canyon water. The only canyon water is that 
from Davis Creek. The right was in existence according 
to this filing prior to 1928 for use on the land to the west 
of the highway. 
Defendant's Exhibit No. 1 is a map received in 
evidence, (T. 153), which shows the lands owned by 
David L .. Rice, some of which W·ere said to he· served 
by Davis Creek. It is difficult to determine how the 
trial court came to the ~conclusion in his memorandum 
decision ·that David L. Rice had 64 acres of land In-
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eluding 8 acres on the Aus-tin Rice tract that needed irri-
gation from his 32 hours of water, (R. 119), and then 
in his findings of fact No. 8, ('R. 123), found that David 
L. Rice irrigated from 60 to 70 acres north of Davis 
Creek from his 32 hours and did not use any of the 32· 
hours until Austin Rice took up his residence in 1937 on 
the decreed tract, after which time part of the 32. hours 
was used to irrigate 8 acres of Austin's land, (R. 124). 
As a ma:tter of fact, from the map., Exhibit 1, and 
the testimony of LeGrande Rice, the witness who testi-
fied to the specific acreage watered, it is hard to tell 
what acreage of David L. Rice received water through 
the North Ditch from Davis Creek, and so far as this 
case was concerned it is irnrna:terial. That was not an 
issue in the case. From the testimony of LeGrande 
Riee, (T. 154-158), it appears that there were either 
51, 59, 64 or 78 acres of David L. Rice watered from 
Davis Creek, excluding the Austin Rice tract. LeGrande 
testified, ('T. 157), that they never took any wa:ter out 
of the Davis Creek to use on the Austin Rice tract. So 
according to him the Austin Rice tract had none of the 
32 hours, and it was. all useq on land to the north, and 
whether or not there wer·e 31, 37 or 45 acres on the Rawl 
Rice place, ( T. 154), 3, 5 or 8 acres on the Ezra Fos-s 
Richards place or any a'Creag,e on the Glover field, (T. 
155, 156, 157), is hard to tell. In one place he says therie 
were 8 acres of the Glover field irrigated, ( T. 155), and 
in another place he said they didn't water any of it ex-
cept with early wa:ter, (T. 172). On cross examination 
he testified that through the North Ditch they watered 
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adequately 30 acres with 14 to 16 hours but that most 
of it was in orchard· tha:t was never watered, (T. 172), 
which leaves the testimony meaningless, and the rest 
of the water they would run over to the Rawl Rice pro .. 
perty which consisted of 31 acres, (T. 172). We get no 
help either from Exhibit 1. However, Austin Rice in his 
affidavit supporting his motion for a new trial declared 
that none of the land north of Davis Creek was watered 
from Davis Creek prior to 1921 because the North Ditch 
wasn't built until then, (R. 140), and this is not disputed 
by the defendant in her affidavit, (R. 146). 
The trial court did not believe LeGrande Rice or 
any other of defendant's witnesses who testified that 
there was no water from Davis Creek used on the Austin 
Rice tract, and it can't be determined from the testimony 
what part of David L. Rice's 32 hours was used on land 
other than Austin Rice's, which land it was, when the 
use commenced, whether the water was appurtenant to 
the land, or whether it was used by David L. Rice at the 
·time of the will or at the time of his death. To assume 
anything from LeGrande Rice's evidence as to the 
acreage watered from Davis Creek would be pure guess-
work and also, outside of any issues of this cas-e. As to 
the Austin Rice tract, hi'S, testimony is untrue and was 
not belie¥ed by the trial court. 
The court did not heli~eve those witnesses who testi-
fied that no water from Davis Creek was used through 
the White Ditch on the Austin Rice place and decreed 
Austin four hours per week. 
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We shall discuss separately testimony 'vith reference 
to the water right and the testimony with reference to 
the omitted property involving the omitted barn and 
corral. 
THE TESTIMONY WITH REFERENCE TO· 
THE WATER RIGHT 
First it may be advisable to consider def-endant's 
evidence concerning the water right, and her reasons for 
omitting it from her petition for distribution. The de-
fendant offered the testimony of eight witnesses includ-
ing herself, three of whom were her brothers who stand 
to profit if the deeree of distribution remains as it is 
and who 'villlose if the decree is amended as prayed for 
in the petition of the app·ellant, Austin Rice. One of the 
other witnesses for defendant is a nephew and one is a 
cousin. The testimony of all of them will be stated. 
It may be advantageous first to eonsider the testi-
mony of the defendant and see from her own lips what 
she intended to do, what her frame of mind was at the 
time she petitioned for distribution and at the time of 
the trial. She stated that she told Austin that under the 
will he was only left the p~rop1erty below the road and 
not the barn, (T. 231); that at the time she presented 
her petition for distribution she lrn.ew there was no water 
right and never had been any water right on the Austin 
Rice place except drainage water; that there was no 
water right at all from Davis Creek, (T. 232); that in 
presenting the petition for distribution to the court and 
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securing the decree of distribution as it now reads she 
was the one who determined what the facts should be 
as to the water and the· land occupied by Austin, (T. 233). 
She further testified that the p·etition for distribution 
purposely left out the water right ~even though it was 
included in the inventory of the land, and that she didn't 
petition the court to distribute the land to Austin with 
water rights pertaining thereto and didn't call the court's 
attention to the omission because she knew there wasn't 
any water there---she didn't call any of this to the 
court's attention, (T. 235). 
Erma Rice testified that she read the will to Austin 
and that Austin was in the court room at the time the 
decree of distribution was entered and remained until the 
proceedings were concluded, ( T. 232). Her testimony 
with reference to the barn and corral land we shall refer 
to later on in this brief. We shall also later on refer to 
her specific denial of conversations Austin and his wife 
claimed she had with them concerning the water right. 
To sup,port her story that there was no water fron1 
Davis Creek appurtenant to the Austin Rice land she 
called as witnesses her three ·brothers, Rawl S. Rice, 
James S. Rice, LeGrande Rice, iand her nephew, Rawl 
Rice; also the three other witnesses referred to abov·e. 
Rawl S. Rice, defendant's first witness stated that 
' he had been familiar with the Austin Rice· p·roperty up 
until 1929; that there used to he a ditch running south 
from Davis Creek towards the Austin Rice p·roperty 
known as the White Ditch, and that never was any water 
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diverted fron1 Davis Creek through the vVhite Ditch to 
irrigate the Austin Rice property; that the Austin Rice 
property had springs on it and drains, (T. 107-110). He 
pointed out on Exhibit 1 a circle in the southeast corner 
of the Austin Rice property vvhich he said was a spring. 
Whether a well was dug he couldn't say, (T. 110). This 
spring is the well for which ap;plication was made by 
David L. Rice as shown by Exhibit "H" which David 
L .. Rice said was dug in 1928, the year before the wit-
ness, Rawl S. Rice, left the prop·erty. He said there was 
a s-econd sp.ring which he marked on Exhibit 1 with 
the letter "A" a little above the center of the Austin 
Rice p-roperty but this ·spring was boxed in. There· was 
another spring which he marked with the letter ''B'' 
and one which he marked with the letter '' C''; that the 
drain started with a culvert under the Bamberger Rail-
way and generally described the drain as shown in red 
on Exhibit 1 marked 1, 2 and 3, ( T. 111, 112.) ; that the 
drains were 2112 to 3 feet deep and were dug to get the 
water off the land. He then described a most unusual 
system of irrigating by digging up the drains, plugging 
them with sa;cks and letting the water overflow, (T. 113), 
and again rep·eated that the Austin Rice land was never 
served by the White Ditch, (T. 119), but qualified his 
testimony later on by saying that after he left. the place 
in 1929 he does.n 't know what his father or Austin did 
with reference to bringing water from Davis Creek 
through the White Ditch to the Austin Rice property but 
imagined they us·ed the White Ditch, (T. 124). With 
reference to irrigating by the drains, Raw! S. Rice also 
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stat·ed that the drains were put in about 1925 or 1926, 
( T. 126), and th'at 1the wells were dug in 1934, ( T. 128). 
All of this was years after David S. Rice acquired the 
property with appurtenant water rights. 
James S·. Rice t~estified he was familiar with the 
property up to 1939 (T. 130) and after that time had had 
contact with it; that only occasionally was water used 
from Davis Creek on the Glover field, tract 9 in Exhibit 
1, (T. 132). Rawl Rice testified to the same thing; that 
probably half of the Glover field was nev;er irrigated, 
(T. 114). (The trial court must have included the Glover 
tract to reaeh a total of 60 to 70 acres watered north of 
Davis Creek.) James S. Rice stated that he never knew 
of anyone using water through the White Ditch for the 
irrigation of the Austin Rice place, (T. 133). He then 
described the thr·ee springs and the drains, ( T. 134, 
135), and stated that the irrigation was by drains, ( T. 
138). He never saw his father use water out of the well 
near the highway which was dug in 1928, (T. 142). He 
admitted that the White Ditch goes past Austin's place 
and down further, but he knows that Austin never got 
water out of the White Ditch from 1937 up~ to the pres-
ent time, (T. 145). This witness. was very evasive, but 
the for,egoing is the material substance of his testimony. 
LeGrande Rice went into great detail in describing 
how the Austin Rice land was irrigated by drains. He 
testified that he knew the land all his life up, to 1945; 
that they would irrigate from the drains by digging up 
a section of tile, plug up the drain and then the water 
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\vould run down five rows at a time, (T. 158); that they 
\Yould block the drains up after digging them up and 
back the water up about 25 rods. They would plug up 
the drain about every fifty feet and let the water run 
on the rows and take th·e saek out, run it another fifty 
feet and do that alternately until the irrigation was com-
pleted; that the drain was about 31;2 to 4 feet deep, and 
that this generally started in :11ay; that the rows were 
about thirty rods long, and it took ·eight 'Or nine hours 
to a row, and he could water 25 or 30 rows at a time, 
and five acres in three or four days; that eleven acres 
would take ten or eleven days, etc., (T. 176-180). This 
witness testified that the drain on the Glove-r property 
can't water the Glover property to the north hecaus~e. 
the ground is too high, and when the ground is high, you 
can't water from a drain, ( T. 17 4). He had no trouble, 
however, in watering Austin's high ground from Austin's 
drain. Counsel for defendant endeavored to have the 
eourt make a finding that irrigating on the Austin Rice 
p~lace was done by means of drains in this fantastic man-
ner. We objected to any such find~g upon the grounds 
that the drains -couldn't possibly affect the easterly por-
tion of the land, and that the drains were not a feasible 
method of irrigation. 'The court struek out the attempted 
finding with reference to irrigating by means of drains, 
( R. 138), ·and o bvious.Iy ·di~d nut believe the wiltn~esses 
who testifi.ed to this absurd rigamarole. The court also 
struck out defendant's attempt to have the findings re-
cite that the defendant read the will to the plaintiff and 
he expressed satisfaction with the pro~sions n1ade for 
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him, (R .. 138). L,e.Grande Rice also testified as did the 
other witn,esses before him that his father had 32 hours 
of water from Davis Creek, (T. 153), and that up to 1945 
they never did any irrigating except by the drains; that 
he ·never knew of his father or brothers ever taking 
water from the White Ditch unless it was surplus water; 
that never when the water was on turns was water taken 
from ·Davis Creek through the White Ditch to the 
Austin Rice property, (T. 157). He admitted, how·ever, 
that Lund, whose place is south of the Austin Rice 
place, had two shares from Davis Creek, and that the 
water did· come down to the Lund pJace; that the White 
Ditoh did ·carry water pa'st the Austin Riee place, (T. 
161) ; that the place north of Austin Rice's, the Sabin 
place, now known as the Kamhertis place·, did have water 
running down through the White Ditch, (the -cement 
ditch) the last time he was there three or four years 
ago, (T. 161, 162). He admitted, however, that Austin 
did run surplus water from the Davis Creek almost every 
year until the water went on turns, sometimes as late 
as July; that he did have a surplus right in the White 
Ditch almost every year from year to year, (T. 165), 
and that Austin did use water from the White Ditch on 
his pla.ce; that the ditch now ends at Austin's, (T. 166), 
about the middle of the field at the top end, (T. 167). 
He stated that the David L. Rice 32 hour turn starts 
Tuesday night at 9 :00 and ends Thursday morning at 
5:00, (T. 170). 
The next witness for the defendant was Rawl Rice 
' ' 
a grandson of David L. Rice, and a nephew of the de-
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fen dan t. He was 29 years old at the time of the trial, 
said he had been familiar with the David L. Rice farms 
around Farmington all his life up· until 1939 which 
would be until he was about 20 years old, and then the 
last two years he had worked on th~em, (T. 189, 190); 
that he had helped to take care of the Aus.tin Rice pro-
perty; that he neve-r knew of any water being taken 
through the White Ditch to the Austin Rice place from 
his grandfather's 32 hours of water or any other water 
through the White Ditch. He was. in the war from 1942 
to 1946, (T. 192). He was in the war when the will was 
made and when David Rice died, and for several y·ears 
p~rior to that. This witness admitted that Austin. Rice 
used surplus water from the Davis Creek and that he had 
trouble with Austin in 1946 over the water; that Austin 
claimed he had ten shares. of water from the Creek, and 
Erma said there was no water going to Austin, to help 
him out with the early water, but when she needed it 
or the other farms needed it, not to let him have any; 
that Austin went ahead and took the water and then 
arrangements were made for him to take it until they 
could find out for sure whose it was; that this is the 
only time there was ever any trouble with Austin over 
the water, and the only time during his acquaintance with 
the property when there had been any trouble, and that 
it all arose after the death ·of David L. Rice and after 
the decree of distribution, ( T. 192, 194) ; that the time 
he had the trouble was in August, 1946. This witness 
said he never knew of Austin taking any water through 
the White Ditch up to 1939, (T. 196). 
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Roy White, a cousin of the defendant, (T. 202), 54 
years old, testified that he lived about one quarter of a 
mile north ·of the Austin llice. p·roperty all his life and 
was familiar with Davis Creek. He stated that on the 
\Vhite Ditch immediately adjoining Davis Creek to the 
south was the Hughes prop~erty, next wa;s the Wilcox 
property, then came his own property, and then immed-
iately adjoining him on the south was the S. E. White 
p·roperty now occup~ied by s'Ome peop~le named Newman; 
that beyond the }~·ewman prop~erty was the Kamhertis 
prop·erty which is across the street on the west. The 
next was the farm of David L. Rice pu.rchased by him 
from Stephenson, (T. 198, 199). Contrary to defend-
ant and her other witness·es he testified that he had seen 
J?avid L. Rice take early water through the White Ditch 
to the Austin Rice farm all through his teen years from 
1910 to 1919, ( T. 199) ; that then a flood came down the 
White Ditch and nobody got water down the Whit~e 
Ditch in the 1918 season; that the following s.eason, 
1919, they set out to reestablish the ditch, and he and 
David Rice talked the situation over about getting the 
early water down, and he and David Rice went to work 
on the ditch, and that Rawl Rice worked on the ditch; 
that they had a good deal of difficulty and it washed 
out faster than they could get it in, and that Da:vid 1 .. 
Rice said, "You take the water, I give it up." (T. 200); 
that he never saw David Rice take the water after that; 
that he has no recollection of seeing any of the Rices take 
water from the ~itch to the Austin Rice fa.rm over a 
long period of time, pos'Sibly up until the last year or 
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so, and that would apply to any vvater vvhatsoever, high 
water or turns. The VVhite Diteh was cemented in 1934, 
( T. 201). On cross examination he stated that he vvas 
a\Yay from the prop~erty quite a bit from 1935 to 1943; 
that his turn to use the \Yater comes in at 6 :30 on Thurs-
day evening and continues until noon, so that if Austin 
had a turn from 7 :00 the previous night to 5 :00 Thurs-
day morning, that would be in the middle of the night, 
and there would be no occasion for.him to see whether 
Austin took the water or not, ( T. 207). In spite ·of this, 
he still insists that Austin did not take any water until 
the last year. He never saw him taking any high water, 
(T. 207, 208). The high water is the surplus water that 
runs in high water season, -commencing in April and 
up sometime towards the end of June, (T. 204, 205). It 
later dev.eloped that he took his water from D-avis Creek 
through another source than the White Ditch and only 
used the White Ditch about four hours a week 'Since 1934, 
that is. from 6 :30 to 10:30 Thursday night he would be 
on the White Ditch, but not after that, (T. 213). 
Mr. Valance C. Glover next testified that he had 
lived in Farmington all his life and was familiar with 
Davis Creek and the ditches leading out of the south side 
of it including the White Ditch; that he owns property 
south of the Austin Rice piece, (T. 213, 214), the p~ro­
perty formerly owned by Mr. Lund. He had never seen 
in the last 25 years any one watering the Austin Rice 
prop~erty from the Whit~e Ditch. 25 years ago he no-
ticed 1\fr. David L. Rice using the water in the flush part 
of the season, but at no other 'tim-e until the last two 
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years, ( T. 216). The Rices irrigated their farm from 
the drains. In the last two years Austin has used water 
from the White Ditch, but he has never seen Austin use 
water from the White Ditch other than in the last two 
years, ( T. 219). He, the witness, doesn't need water 
from the White Ditch-he has wells and springs, (T. 
220, 221). David Rice used water out of the White Ditch 
up until1930, (T. 222). 
Clyde Wilcox testified that he was 5a years old and 
lived in South Farmington all his life ·except from 1914 
to 1924; that he was familiar with Davis Creek and the 
..._L\_ustin Rice place, with the White Ditch and the persons 
'vho took water from it; that he has a water right from 
Davis Creek of 24 shares; that his land is about one-half 
block south of Davis Creek; that he never knew of David 
Rice using water from the White Ditch for irrigation 
on Austin Rice's p·roperty; never saw him take water 
out of the ditch; never saw any of the Rice family using 
any water from Davis Creek through the White Ditch, 
(T. 227-229). 
Thus, it app·ears from defendant's witnesses that 
some of them testified that neither Austin or his father 
ever used any water out of Davis Creek through the 
White Ditch, and others teglttified that they both us·ed 
it. The Rice family, however, ineluding the defendant 
were very positive that there was no water right from 
Davis Creek for the Au'stin Rice place, although one of 
the brotlh·ers did 'admit th,a·t his fiather and Austin used 
surplus water. 
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On behalf of the plaintiff Clifford Hughes te:stified. 
He is an employee of the State Engineer's Office, (T. 4), 
resides in Farmington about one-half a mile north of 
the Austin Rice property on the east side of the street, 
(T. 5). His mother owns the property right next south 
of Davis Creek through which the White Ditch flows, 
(T. 12). He is the secretary of the Davis Creek Water 
Users Company which is an unineorporated comp,any, 
(T. 10). The prop~erty served by the White Ditch is, 
first his mother's, then Clyde Wilcox, then Roy White, 
then Gunder Newman, then across the street Harry 
Kambertis which is just north of Austin Rice, then 
Austin Rice, and formerly Rasmus Lund's estate south 
of Austin Rice. They all get water from the White Ditch 
which in turn comes from Davis Creek, (T. 13). He was 
born and rais~ed in the location where he now lives, hut 
he doesn't pretend that he kept track of where the water 
was being used from the W'11ite Ditch other than that of 
his mother, ( T. 15, 16). He has, however, sHen water 
turned into the White Ditch by the Rice family, and 
there was no David Rice land other than the Austin 
Rice farm that eould be served by the White Ditch. 
David Rice took his 32 hours consecutively in the middle 
of the week. The Austin Rice farm has been farmed as 
long ·as he can remember with various kinds of crops. 
·' 
which could not have been matured without water. The 
kind that required water have been on there and have 
matured, and there is no other source of surface irriga-
tion water for Austin Rice's: traet west of the highway 
except Davis Creek through the White Ditch. He has 
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seen Austin Rice using wa.ter from the White Ditch for 
the last three or four ye~..rs and prior to that time, and 
he has seen the water taken out on the Austin Rice 
land both at high water and when the water was on 
turns, (T. 23, 24). He never saw David Rice personally 
take water out from any of the ditches either north or 
south of Davis Creek, (T. 25). The water goes on turns 
according to the season, generally in June. Prior to 
going on turns the p~eople who had water rights helped 
themselves by arrangem·ent with the water master, ('T. 
25). Austin Rice took water through the White Ditch 
in the early 30's when the ditch was washed out. He 
took the water across the Hughes' place when the ditch 
was washed out. This was water from Davis Creek. Then 
the cement ditch was put in, (T. 28). He has seen Austin 
Rice turn water into ,the White Ditch from Davis Creek 
in the irrigation season, ( T. 29, 30), and he was also one 
of the first to get early water through the ditch. His ob-
servation has been such as any neighbor would make. 
He has not be-en p·articularly int·erested one way or 
another, (T. 30-31). 
Irvin Hughes, 48 years of age, testified he lived right 
south of Davis Creek east of the highway. The White 
Pi·tch .comes right through 'their p-roperty; that he has 
lived there all his life and is familiar with the Austin 
Rice place to the west of the highway; that water from 
Davis Creek through the White Ditch has been us~ed 
on the Austin Rice place for as long back as he can re-
member; that David Rice turned the water down into 
the ditch, and he has also se~en A ust.in use it in the last 
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fe"~ years since he has been living on the property; that 
Austin used it all during the summer and also for early 
crops. He used the water after it was on shar~es. He 
also used it while his father was living, and about three 
years ago Austin got s-cared by a rattlesnake when he 
was going up the ditch. That was in July; that his recol-
lection of the us~e of water on the Austin Rice place from 
Davis Creek dat.es back to the time when he was a very 
young boy, (T. 268-272). In fact, Austin flooded them 
out a couple of times by letting the ditch get clogged, 
and it pretty near washed the cement ditch out. ThiB 
occasion was about five years ago. There was no other 
place for the David L. Rice water to go hut to the Austin 
Rice farm, (T. 273, 274). The water had gone on shares 
when this clogging of the ditch occurred. The water goes 
on shares sometimes in April but most years in May or 
June, (T. 275). 
David R. Lund, Sr., 56 years old, testified he was 
familiar with the Austin Rice place, formerly owned 
by David L. Rice, on the west side of the highway; that 
he lived next door south, and that before David L. Rice 
bought the Austin Rice place Lund's father rented it 
for two years, and he has been familiar with it ev~er 
since-that's since 1897 or 1898. He was familiar with 
the Austin Rice farm up until 1915. He went to Salt 
Lake from 1915 to 1921 and then stayed on the farm 
south of Austin's until 1923 at his father's p~lace. The 
cem~ent ditch was built in 1934, and he has known about 
the property since the cement ditch was built, (T. 278). 
From his earliest recollection the Rice property got 
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their irrigation water out of Davis Creek through the 
ditch running along the ~east side of the road, thence 
across the road just north of the Rice property, and 
the Rices took the water when it was surplus and also 
n1ost any time they wanted to use it, but after the first 
of May, the water was rotated, and it was taken then 
once a vveek, and it was used all summer long. Mr. David 
L. Rice to'Ok it 'and took it dorwn to Mr. Lund's father's 
place whose turn -came after David L. Rice, and Lund 
took the water off of David L.. Rice. They had the 
water all the time they were there. Since 1934 he has 
not been familiar with the ditch. They moved away from 
the property, but prior to that time David L. Rice used 
the water as above indicated, (T. 278-281). Mr. Lund 
had three hours of water on his place, and in the last 
part of the season not very much of it came· down, but 
David Rice irrigated the Austin Rice land with water 
·from Davis Creek the whole season of the year once a 
vveek. He knows how often the water was used because 
they took the water after Rice. This was every year from 
1908 to 1915 once a week. It would be running down on 
the Rice field when he went to get it in his turn, (T. 280, 
281, 282). The upp~er p.art of the David L. Rice (Austin 
Rice) farm had no drains in it. The drains were on the 
lower end of the farm. He distinctly remembers from 
the time he was a little boy six or seven years. old, when 
his father leased the p~rope-rty before Rice acquired it 
and later purchased th~ adjoining p~rop,erty, that the 
water was used on the Austin Rice farm from Davis 
Creek, (T. 282, 283). Mr. Lund. had also seen David 
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Rice's boys watering with the Davis Creek water, and 
in 1934 David L. Rice and the witness's father tried to 
get them to cement the ditch down past their property, 
and the p1ersons cementing it wouldn't do it. (This last 
testimony the court struck out, but we submit that it 
was competent and it was error to strike it.) The court 
felt that the evidence was immaterial because the evi-
denee already shows the ditch was down to the property, 
( T. 286, 287) . 
James H. l\fcQuiston testified in behalf of the plain-
tiff. This witness knew nothing about t4e trial or the 
testimony ·of any of the other witness.es. He had never 
discussed the cas-e until about an hour before he was 
called to the witness stand because it was only that noon 
when he hap:pened to be in Farmington and saw counsel 
for the plaintiff and asked him how the Austin Rice 
case was coming along. He came into -court without pre-
vious notice ( T. 290, 291). He testified that hi~. place is 
approximately a mile south of Austin's place; that 
Austin has worked for him for five years; that he and 
Austin exchange work, and that he, McQuiston, irrigated 
Austin's place two years, and tha.t the source of the 
irrigation water for the Austin Riee place was from 
the first mountain creek north of where he lives, ''That. 
is the only source of water from the canyon north of 
me that flows to the road or over the road. I don't know 
the name of the creek." It is the mountain creek north 
of the Rice place. It comes down a cement ditch from 
the point of diversion, and he has been down the fu1l 
length of the ditch and turned the water in and taken 
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it to the Austin Rice place and irrigated it on the Austin 
Rice p~lace, and he has seen Austin irrigate with that 
water each and every year for five years (T. 287, 288). 
Austin irrigated and grew on his place onions, zucchini 
squash, radishes, peas, fruit trees and alfalfa hay (T. 
289, 290). The Austin Rice place was irrigated from 
this water in June, July and August every year for the 
last five years ( T. 290). l-Ie . has stayed with Austin 
when he took the water in the night ti1ne. It was not 
always at night, but he has helped Austin irrigate at 
night (T. 292). When Austin irrigated in the last five 
years, it was in the evening because the witness worked 
at the Cudahy Packing Plant and didn't get off work 
until 5:30, and it was nearly 6:00 when he left, and 
7 :00 when he would get home, and Austin would he 
irrigating at 9:00, 10:00 or 11:00 at night when }vlc-
Quiston. got to his place. R·e doesn't know the exact 
hours of Austin's turn. In the spring of the year Austin 
got the water whenever he wanted it, and he used the 
water in the evening when it went on turns (T. 291-294). 
He has also seen Austin use the water in the mornings 
and the afternoons. 
Austin Rice, the plaintiff and appellant, and Annie 
Rice, his wife, testified fully concerning the land oc-
eupied by Austin at the time of the making of the will 
and at the time of death of David L. Rice; about the 
legal proceedings involving the probate of the will and 
the distribution of the estate; about the water appur-
tenant to the ·decreed land; the nature and characteristics 
of the land, and! the use made of it throughout 'the years. 
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Annie Rice had been married to Austin for 17 years. 
They lived four years in Centerville, three years on the 
\'l1ite Place ( ,,~hich is two farms north of the land under 
consideration here), and on their p·resent place since 
1937, (T. 31). The tracts of land outlined in the abstract 
(Ex. B) both east and \Vest is the land they have occupied 
since 1937, (T. 32, 33). She has been familiar with the 
land occupied by them, referred to in this brief, the west 
part of it, as the Austin Rice farm), all of her married 
life, and in 1944 at the time the will was made they were 
occupying the same p·roperty that they now occupy. 
Their house is located on the west side of Highway 
91, and their barn and corral is across the street east, 
( T. 33, 34) . She has been familiar with the property 
since 1930. No crop·s have ever been grown on the piece 
east of the road-that is just used for barn, corral and 
farm implements, (T. 35). On the tract west of the 
highway the tract in 1930 was in alfalfa. An orchard 
was planted in 1934. David L. Rice bought the trees, and 
Austin p~lanted them-peaches and ap·ricots, and they are 
there now. The alfalfa was -on the place until they 
moved there in 1937. In 1934 there was a crop of cu-
cumbers of approximately an acre which were matured. 
These cucumbers were irrigated out of Davis Creek 
through the White Ditch, (T. 35, 36). David L .. Rice fre-
quently visited the place when wa.ter was running on it 
from Davis Creek, (T. 3'7). 'They moved onto the p~ro­
perty in 1937 at the request of David L. Rice who said, 
''I will give you the place and build you a house on it, 
and you can have it.'' And he did this. The house is 
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there now. They moved in one week before Thanksgiving 
in 1937, (T. 37). The orchard was watered from Davis 
Creek. There is no other place to obtain water· for it. 
Water from Davis Creek has been used on the orchard 
ever since it was planted in 1934. After 1937 the alfalfa 
was plowed up. Seed corn, tomatoes, carrots, parsnips, 
peas, onions, potatoes and sugar beets were planted. AU 
of these crops required water to mature them. They 
were matured, and the water for these crops was out 
of Davis Creek through the White Ditch. There was 
no other source of water for them. She and Austin 
always used the water ten hours every week. They had 
the last ten hours of David L. Rice's turn while he was 
living and with his knowledge, and he would come down 
and tell them to go ahead and take the water, (T. 38, 39). 
She knevv nothing about the will in 1944. At that time 
they had been on the place ap,proximately seven years 
using the water ten hours a week for the entire irrigation 
season every year, (T. 40). They cannot get along with-
out the water, and it is necessary for the use on tha;t 
land. There is no waste in the use of ten hours, and the 
ten hours is necessary to mature the crops. The lower 
part of the land is all p,asture and always has been, 
(T. 41). The crops have been raised on the upper part. 
The first they knew about the will was after !ir. Rice 
died when Erma Riee came down to the house and said 
that ·Mr. Rice had given them the p~lace they now oc-
cupied. That was in the summer of 1945. She said noth-
ing to them about reading the will. She told them that 
Mr. Riee had left them the P111ace they now oecupied, and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3X 
that they were well ·cared for. Erma Rice over the years 
had been on the p~lace and seen the kind of crops they 
"\Vere raising, lmew "\Vhat they were growing, had been 
there and seen the use they were making of the property 
to the east where the corral is and had remarked, ''How 
do you make them cows stand still in the corner to milk 
them.'' The 'vitness knew nothing about what was in 
the will other than "\Vhat Erma Rice told her, (T. 41, 
42, 43). 1frs. Annie Rice didn't see the will until she 
came up to the courthouse, (which was in August, 1946), 
and Erma Rice didn't tell her that she vvas not going to 
get the water for her p·roperty nor the barn and corral 
property, (T. 43, 44). The first time the witness knew 
that Erma Rice was claiming they had no water was 
in 1946 when Austin went up to get the water, and she 
told him he didn't have any water right, (T. 44). When 
the petition for distribution was set for hearing she and 
Austin received a letter for Austin to appear. The wit-
ness did not go and does not know what transpired, 
(T. 45). 
Late in the summer of 1946 the defendant, Erma 
Ric.e, told Austin and Annie they didn't have any water 
right, and the witness then went to the courthouse and 
read the will that David Rice had made, and that is 
the first time she knew the conditions of the will. They 
then checked the tax notice and found they were short 
several acres according to what was bequeathed them, 
(T. 46). The Bamberger Railroad and the lower High-
way 91 crosses the land bequeathed to them, but they 
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never did have any use of that property and never oc-
cupied it, ( T. 46). 
On cross examination the witness said there were 
30 trees in the orchard and there are now 24; that their 
hours for watering from Davis Creek through the White 
Ditch was from 7:00 P.M. Wednes,day to 5:00 A.M. 
Thursday, (T. 50, 53). There are ten acres of tillable 
land requiring water, and the balance of the tract is 
in pasture land which is sub-irrigated, approximat·ely 
18 acres. The tillable land has no springs or wells on 
it ·except the well in the southeast corner which has never 
been used. The tillable land is dry, (T. 57, 58). There 
was a well down in the p·asture, but it is dry. All their 
garden crops were raised on the ten acres of tillable land. 
None of these crops w·ere ever irrigated from drains, 
(T. 58). Since they went on the place none of the Rices 
helped them at all. They have taken care of the place 
and put up the crops themselves. Some years they 
p~aid the taxes and some years David L. Rice paid them. 
When the alfalfa was on the ground, there was about 
seven or eight acres of it, and that was all above the 
pasture, ( T. 59). 
When Erma Rice told them that under the will 
they received the place they now occupied, she didn't 
s:ay anything about the land ~across the street not being 
theirs, and she didn't say anything to them about not 
getting\ any wat·er. The first time she said anything 
about them not getting the place across the street or not 
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getting any water 'vas after the decree of distribution 
was entered which was in the fall of 1946, (T. 61). 
As to wells and drains on the land, Mrs. Rice testi-
fied that there is the well in the southeast -corner that 
cannot be used because the State has stopp·ed it on ac-
count of quicksand. There is water in it, but it has 
never been used. The ·drains eou1dn't irrigate ~the tillable 
lands because they are too low, and you couldn't pump 
enough to make it worth while, (T. 64). 'Many times the 
witness has seen LeGrande Rice watering the Austin 
Rice farm with water from Davis Creek. In 1940 or 
1941 he irrigated the sugar beets and watered them 
every week. N·either she nor Austin nor any one else 
that she knows of ever irrigated the Austin Rice farm 
from the drains upon the farm. She never heard of 
such a thing until she heard it at this trial, (T. 262, 263). 
It is not possible to irrigate the land from the springs or 
drains because you would have to push water up hill to 
do so. They are all lower than the tillable land, ( T. 265). 
The witness testified that at one time in the summer 
of 1946 Erma Rice carne to their place and discussed 
the Davis Creek water and said if you are going to 
take any water, take it all, but ·don't split it up, but 
I think you are entitled to three hours. Austin told 
Erma to go and see Pat Rice, the water master, and 
Erma cam·e back later; that she, the witness, was not 
there at the second conversation, (T. 2·63-265). Erma 
Rice denied this conversation and also denied Austin's 
version of the conversation to be hereinafter set forth. 
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The ease with which Austin Rice became confused 
and could be imposed upon is apparent throughout his 
testimony. He had great.difficulty in remembering dates 
and was frequently conf.used on them. When attempting 
to fix the time when he came up to court and when he 
first talked to Erma about the will he said that Erma 
vvas first down to his place in 1946, then said it was in 
194 7, and then that it was in 1943, ( T. 81, 82) ; whereas, 
his father died in February of 1945. As to dates he was 
uncertain, but as to events he was not uncertain. The 
time when Erma first told him about the will was be-
fore the time he talked to her in the courthouse, (T. 82). 
He came up to the courthous~e after he had talked to 
Erma about the will. The time he talked to Erma about 
the will was after his fathe·r died, (T. 82, 83). The time 
he first talked to Erma was about three months after 
his father died, when she told him his father had left 
him this farm and it is yours, and you will be taken 
care of, ( T. 84). He didn't read the will. He came up 
to the court when he got a letter or a card telling him 
to come, and he doesn't remember when it was, but he 
came up to the eourthouse and Erma said, ''You had 
just as well go home''; that he was taken care of and 
there wasn't any use of his staying, so he went home, 
( T. 85). There was never any question rais·ed about his 
use of the water from Davis Creek after ills father died, 
and he went right on using it, and no question was raised 
until in the fall of 1946 after the decree of distribution 
was entered, (T. 86) .. Since they went on the land Erma 
has seen them using the barn and the corral, (T. 87). 
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At the time of the making of the will and at the 
time of his fa'tlher's de~ath ·he was- occupying and using 
the same land, that is the land shown on the abstract 
both to th;e east and west of the road, (T. 66). The land 
across the street to the east of the road is fenced and is 
the same as shown on the abstract. It has been feneed 
as long as he can remember, and he is 42 or 43 years 
old, (finally settled on 43), ( T. 67) . He can remen1her 
back when he was six or seven years old, and the land 
across the street where the barn and corral are has been 
fenced as long as he can remember it, (T. 68). 
As to the land decreed him which is west of the 
highway, he remembers that from the time he was seven 
or eight years old. In the early years it was used for 
pasture and hay, and for the hay the water came from 
Davis Creek through the White Ditch. There were 
reguiar shares of ten hours from his e:arliest recollection. 
The water was used all summer long in the irrigation 
and the non-irrigation season, (T. 72). The David L. 
Rice turn of 32 hours started at 9 :00 Tuesday night and 
runs to 5:00 Thursday morning, (T. 73). The turn for 
the prop·erty decreed him is from 7 :00 Wednesday 
night until Thursday at 5 :00, and that has been as long 
as he can remember. Before 1926 the land was used for 
hay and pasture, (T. 74). The water from Davis Creek 
was used on it. There are about nine acres of land that 
were .later planted in corn, sugar beets and other garden 
crops. You cannot mature these crops without the Davis 
Cr·eek water of ten hours, (T. 75). Alfalfa was planted 
in 1932, but you have to rotate that after five years when 
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it runs out, (T. 76). He went on the place in 1937 and 
has always used the ten hours of water throughout the 
season. Som·e of the neighbors also gaVie him water, 
(Tr. 77), and he and his father frequently changed hours 
of water and som~times he took the whole 32 hours, 
(T. 79). He went up himself and got the water from 
Davis Creek through th·e White Ditch, and he has done 
that ever since he has been there,· and the lie is no other 
place to get irrigation water for his land, (T. 79). The 
irrigation water is neeessa.ry. You can't mature crops 
on the land without it, (T. 80)0 
Ther•e are about 15 or 16 acres of pasture, and it 
is necessary to water the pasture grass with as much 
water as you can get, but you couldn't use the 'vater 
on the pasture land every year only in the early spring, 
but he watered it as long as he could, (T. 89, 90). He 
didn't have enough water to water it all year around, 
but he did water his garden every week for ten hours 
from Davis Cr·eek, (T. 90). During the years there 
were 11 or 12 acres that have needed irrigating-all the 
vvater they could get all through the season, (T. 91). 
There are no springs on the land, but there are three 
wells, two below the Bamberger and one up by the road, 
and there is one drain that goes clear across the land, 
(To 92). Sometimes in the late fall his father permitted 
him to take all of the 32 hours, ( T 0 96) 
0 
When Erma told him he had been left the property 
he was living on, he was satisfied, and when he went 
up to the courthouse she said ev·erything was taken care 
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of and there 'vas no use of his staying so he went avvay, 
(T. 98, 99). He doesn't remember "\Yhat the l~etteT from 
the Clerk 'vas about, but it vvas som·ething to do with the 
family and that he would hear about the will through the 
court. That was the time his sister told him he didn.'t 
need to stay, (T. 101). 
Austin Rice also testified that he had never tried to 
irrigate his land by drains and that he -couldn't do so. 
If he tried to water from the drains, the tile would plug 
up and fill in, and over one-half of his land is higher 
than the drains, and you couldn't reaeh it in any ·event. 
He never savv his father use the drains to irrigate. His 
father always told him to keep the drains cleaned out, 
(T. 245, 246). T1he S'tate s'topped them from drilling any 
deeper the well on the southeast corner of his property, 
and that well has never been used. Ther·e is something 
like sixteen fe·et of water in it, and it took about four 
days to fill it. When LeGrande watered the beets in 1930, 
he got his water from the White Ditch, and his father 
got the water from the White Ditch to water his beets, 
(T. 247, 248). The witness testified that in the summer 
of 1946 his sister came to him and said not to sp~lit the 
water, if you are going to take it, take it all, and in 
the same conversation she said, ''I suppose you got 
three hours'', and the witness hold her to go and talk 
to Pat Rice, the water master, and later she came back 
and said, "I suppose you got six hours", and the witness. 
told her h·e had ten hours, (T. 250, 251). Erma Rice 
denied this conversation. Erma never complained about 
him taking the water until the summer of 1946 after 
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the decree of distribution. The witness took the water 
all the time during 1944 and 1945 without any objection 
from any one as he had done theretofore, (T. 253, 254). 
She came to see him three times. The last time she 
brought the sheriff, and then the witness brought this 
action, ( T. 261, 262) . 
THE TESTIMONY WITH REFERENCE TO 
THE BARN AND CORRAL PRO,PERTY 
As we have heretofore shown, the testator left to 
Austin the land he now occupies, app.roximately 27 acres 
in Section 31. The land decreed him omitting the Bam-
berger and State Road Rights of Way is slightly more 
than 25 acres. The land decreed him, together with 
the land across the street where th·e barn and corral 
are situated actually amount to 29.09 acres. All of it 
is in Section 31. The main part of the decreed land, 
24.71 acres, was deeded to David L. Rice in 1902, and in 
the same deed the 2.10 acres across the street were also 
deeded to him. They were both p·art of the same trans-
action, (Exhibit '' B '', entry 17). 1% acres across the 
street were deeded to David L. Rice in 1904, (Exhibit 
"B", entry 40). and adjoin the above 2.10 acres. 
Austin Rice testified that the land across the street 
. east of the highway where his barn and corral are lo-
cated has been fenced as long as he can remember. He 
is 43 years old, and his memory dates hack to the time 
wh~n he was six or seven years old. He used this land 
from the time he moved on to the p~roperty in 1937 for 
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his cows, hay, farm machinery and horses. He has no 
other place to keep them, and never ha.s had. He used 
and occupied the land in this manner in 1944 when the 
will was written and also at the time of his father's 
death, (T. 67, 69), a.nd he is still making use of the land 
in the same way. There is a sp·ring under the barn that 
will water the stock, and he has always used that. The 
co,vs drink it, and there is no other plaee for them to· 
water, and this water is necessary for the use of the 
land, (T. 69, 70). Mter he moved onto the land, his 
fath~er did no!t keep any of his hay in the barn. His 
father was not feeding Austin's stock out of the father's 
hay. The father kep't his hay back at the other barn 
up the street. David L. Rice did keep some of his cattle 
in the corral on occasions. Austin fed them, and his 
father paid him to feed them. The father's cattle were 
in the corral along with Austin's stuff. The cattle of 
both of them ran together upon the mountain to the 
east of the corral, and when the father's cattle were 
there, Austin took care of them both in the corral and 
on the mountain, (T. 70, 7~}. His father did not keep 
horses or cattle in the corral or barn after Austin moved 
onto the place without first consulting Austin, (T. 250), 
and about four or five years before his father died his 
' father built himself a new barn, and after that his father 
kept his hay and cattle over there at that place. His 
father never kep't hay or cattle in Austin's barn after 
the new barn was built four or five years ago, ( T. 251, 
252). Erma Rice testified that the father stored some 
hay in Austin's barn that was bought at Kaysville. 
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Austin said his father told him to go to Kaysville and 
haul this hay into the barn, and he would give him the 
hay on shares, and Austin brought a check from the 
Smith Canning Company and a beet check and gave it 
to his father for his share of this hay, ( T. 252, 253). 
(Note: This testimony of Austin's that the father never 
kept his hay and cattle in Austin's barn after the father 
built the new barn was not disputed by any witness.) 
Annie Rice, Austin's wife, testified that the land to 
the east of the road is their barn and corral, and it is 
fenced in, and that they used it since 1937 as the corral 
for hay and the housing of cows and horses, (T. 32); 
that the cattle ran in the corral and were watered there; 
that they kept their farm implements there, (T. 34), and 
that there is no other place and no place on the west 
of the highway for use as a corral and barn or for the 
storage of their farm implements and never has been; 
that the barn has always been on the east land as long 
as she can remember, (T. 35). Erma Rice knew of the 
us-e that the Austin Rice's made of this harn and corral 
prop~erty. She has seen their horses and cows there, and 
on one occasion remarked, ''How do you make those 
co,vs stand still in the corner to milk them", (T. 43), and 
she never said anything about Austin not receiving the 
barn and eorral across the street until after the decree 
of distribution, late in 1946, ( T. 44, 45). David L. Rice 
took some of his ·cattle into the corral to go up onto the 
mountain. David L .. Rice, however, did not use the barn 
for hay to f.eed his cattle there, ( T. 55). He had kept no 
machinery in the barn. He never rep~aired the barn. 
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After they \vent on in 1937, \vhatever work was done on 
the barn she and Austin did. She worked with Austin. 
She helped him repair the fences as well as irrigate. 
S.he helped him milk the cows and feed them, (T. 55, 
56). Rawl Rice did not work on the corral or the barn 
nor did David L. Rice at any time since Austin occupied 
it, (T. 65). The witness di~d testify th1a;t D~avid L. Riee 
used the barn and the corral before she and Austin 
went on the property. 
For the defendant Rawl S. Rice testified that he 
was familiar with the place where the barn is east of 
the highway, ( T. 107). He left the p·rop,erty in 1929, 
so the barn was there at that time, ( T. 108). That is all 
he said about the barn and corral p·roperty·. 
James S. Rice did not testify as to the barn and cor-
ral property. 
LeGrande Rice testified that his father and Austin 
kept cattle at the barn, in and about the barn; that 
the father and Austin had hay there. His father repaired 
the barn twice, but he couldn't say when it was, nor did 
he testify contrary to Austin that after the new barn 
was built up the street four or five years ago his father 
made no further use of the property, (Tr. 159, 160). 
As to the year when the father repaired the barn, Le-
Grane Rice's testimony is quite significant. 
'' Q. What year was the barn repaired by your 
father~ 
A. Couldn't tell you exactly what the year was. 
It was when he was occupying it. 
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when that was? 
A. About two years after he went on there. 
Q. When did he go on? 
A. Couldn't tell you that exactly. 
Q. About two years after your father went on? 
A. No, two years after Austin went on. 
Q. Two years? 
A. About, couldn't swear whether the first or 
second year. 
Q. When did Austin go on? 
A. I don't know for sure, or not, '37, I think. 
Q. Then your father repaired the barn. 
A. Yes, sir." (Tr. 167). 
The witness testified that he didn't know whether 
or not Austin had kept up the pro:perty. He, the 
witness, kept up fences and corrals when he had Dad's 
stock. That was in 1931 up to 1935. Austin and his wife 
helped keep the fences up and repaired them. His father 
kept some of his hay there, and the father and Austin 
fed some of the cattle together. He couldn't say whether 
or not his father paid Austin for doing this, (T. 168). 
Austin kept his farm machinery, his stock and hay at 
the barn. He had no othe-r place to keep them, (T. 169). 
Rawl Rice, the grandson, and nephew of defend-
ant, was in the Army and wasn't on the property from 
1942 to 1946. 'H.e was not there when the will wa:s written 
nor when David L. Rice died, (T. 192). He testified that 
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'vhile he was on the prop~erty his grandfather ran stock 
in the corral and on the mountain and kep1t hay ther~e, 
and that Austin kept cattle and hay there, (T. 191), hut 
he doesn't know anything about the four years he was 
away, (T. 192). He doesn't know whether or not his 
grandfather paid Austin for keep~ing stock in the barn . 
.... t\.ustin had no other plaee to keep his cattle or hay, 
(T. 195 ). 
Neither Roy White nor Clyde H. Wilcox gave any 
.testimony concerning the barn or corral property. 
Valance C. Glover had seen David Rice use the barn 
and corral property, and he has seen LeGrande hauling 
hay there from the Glover field, but no specific times 
were mentioned except that David Rice was around the 
property off and on up to the time of his death. This 
witness did not say when he did the feeding, only that he 
saw David Rice around the barn which, of course, is not 
disputed, (T. 219, 220). The witness did say he couldn't 
tell the years, but he, the witness, rented a piece right 
across from the barn around 1930 to 1940, (T. 225). 
Lately he hasn't been 'there so ·much, but as a boy he 
was raise·d and played with the Rice boys. He hasn't 
been up there the last two or three years, ( T. 225, 
226). Austin kept his cattle, horses and hay in the barn. 
They could have used part of it for Austin and part 
for Dave, but he guessed they stacked the hay separate, 
(T. 226). 
Erma Rice stated that she told Austin his father 
had left hini the property below the road but not the 
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barn; that his father intended that for the mountain 
land and that Austin said he would like to buy the 
' barn, (T. 231). Austin denied the statement that he 
would like to buy the barn. From her own evidence 
Erma Rice admits that she advised Austin that under 
the will he didn't get the barn. She said that her mother 
told Austin to go on using the barn ~as he h1ad done, (T. 
232). She intentionally omitted any reference to the barn 
property in the petition for distribution, (T. 232). She 
was the one who decided what Austin got under the 
will, (T. 233). 
Over objection Erma Rice was permitted to say that 
at heT fatlh1er's bedside the day before the will was signed 
her father instructed 1\ir. Budge, his attorney, to draw 
the will; that her father said that he had a piece of pro-
perty below the highway, and he wanted that to go to 
his son, Austin, and that was to be his full share, and, 
no more, " ( T. 232, 234). In spite of this ~alleged instruc-
tion the will does not read that way, so ·counsel did not 
follow the alleged directions, ( T. 234), and the will does 
not read that Austin is to get a piece of p~roperty below 
the highway. As a matter of fact Exhibit 1 shows that 
David L. Rice had many pieces of property below the 
highway. According to Erma's testimony David L. Rice 
didn't say anything about Austin getting the property 
"he now occupies''. The testimony was not only in-
competent but directly contradicts the will. The wit-
ness conceded that the inventory and the old deed ·carry 
water rights, but she didn't petition the court to dis-
tribute to Austin the land with ap·purtenant water rights, 
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nor did she call the court's attention to the fact that the 
\Yater and the corral property had been left out, ( T. 235). 
She told Austin that the will provided that he should 
not get water or the barn and corral prop~erty, (T. 235, 
236). 
\\..-hen her father died he had 25 milk cows, they 
were kept in the barn and pasture on the Rawl Rice 
place, except those that "'\Yere at Tremonton. They had 
been there all winter. He had nothing on Austin Rice's 
place "'\Yhen he died except some hay which he bought 
in Kaysville. This hay was bought while her father 
was sick and confined t.o the hospital. Austin would have 
paid for it, but after her father became sick, Austin 
\Vasn't at the house and her £:ather vv.asn't able to go 
down th·ere, (T. 239, 240). Nothing was S'aid at the 
hearing on the pe1tition for di!strihution about leaving 
out the water rights and about 'leaving out the land 
on which the barn is located, and nothing was s·aid 
to the judge about it, (T. 241). 
The evidence is undisputed and is corroborated by 
Erma Rice that after David L. Rice built the new barn 
up north, he never kept anything on the Austin Rice 
place, and at the time he died nothing of David L. Rice's 
was on the barn or corral property. 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
1. That finding o~ fact No. 8,_ and particularly the 
first paragraph thereof is not supported by and is con-
trary to the evidence, and the court was in ·error in 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
48 
further finding in said finding No. 8 that David L. Rice 
irrigated from 60 to 70 acres of crops north of Davis 
Creek by what is known as the North Ditch, and that 
David L. Rice after the year 1919 did not use any water 
during his 32 hour turn through the White Ditch, and 
that Austin Rice used the water from Davis Creek 
through the White Ditch to water eight acres of orchard 
and garden, and that said findings are contrary to and 
are not supported by the evidence, and that the court was 
in error in not finding in said paragraph 8 or elsewhere 
that David L. Rice was also one of the land owners 
in the vicinity of said Creek who used such water as. 
they desired for early irrigation from Davis Creek. 
2. That finding of fact No. 9, and particularly the 
second sentence thereof to the effect that there never 
was appurtenant to the 27 acre track decreed Austin 
Rice a ten hour use of Davis Creek each year, hut that 
there was a four hour right from 1 :00 A.M. until 5 :00 
A.M. Thursday of each week appurtenant to said land, 
is contrary to and not supported by the ·evidence, and 
that the court was in error in not finding in said para-
graph 9 or elsewhere in the findings that there was also 
appurtenant to said 27 acre tract water as available 
during the p·eriod when the same was not in turns. 
3. That the court was in error in describing the 
decreed tract a.s consisting of 27.71 acres. 
4. That finding of fact No. 11 is in conflict with 
finding of fact No. 6; that finding of fact No. 12 is in 
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conflict 'vith finding of fact No. 6 and both are in con-
flict with, contrary to, and not supported by th·e evidence. 
5. That finding of fact No. 13 is contrary to and is 
not supported by the evidence, and particularly that 
portion of said finding No. 13 that the barn and corral 
property was not occupied by Austin Rice at the' date 
of the will, and that the said prop1erty is not an essential 
or necessary part of plaintiff's farm. 
6. That finding of fact No. 14 Is not supported 
by and is contrary to the evidence, and particularly that 
portion of said finding of fact No. 14 commencing with 
the third sentence thereof to the effect that Erma Rice 
did not at any time misrepresent any facts or conditions 
to Austin Rice or practice any fraud upon him, and parti-
cularly that portion of fin·ding of fact No. 14 that the 
defendant, Erma Rice, was not guilty of any fraud what-
soever, and that Austin Rice had ample opportunity with-
out p1revention or interference of defendant to inform 
himself, and that he .neglected to interpose any objec-
tion to the granting of the petition for distrihu~tion or the 
entry of the decree. 
7. That finding of fact No. 15 is contrary to and 
not sup~ported by the evidence. 
8. That conclusion of law No. 1 is contrary to and 
not supp·orted by the evidence and is contrary to and 
in conflict with finding of fact No. 6. 
u 9. That conclusion of law No. 2 is in error in 
describing the decreed tract as 27.71 acres, and that the 
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conclusion that plaintiff have decreed to- him four hours 
each week of the waters of Davis Creek from 1 :00 A.M. 
to 5 :00 A.M. on Thursday is contrary to and not sup-
ported by the evidence. 
10. That the decree and the whole thereof is con-
trary to and not supported by the evidence and is erron-
eous in both law and fact. 
11. That the court erred in allowing Erma Rice 
over pJaintiff's objection to testify, (T. 233), as follows: 
'' Q. Now, were you present at the time I was 
taking notes at your father's bedside, the 
day before the Will was signed~ 
A. Y·es, sir, I was. 
Q. Did you hear your father's in·structions to me 
at that time~ 
MR. JONES.: I obj·ect to that, as, 
Q. Answer, Yes or No. 
A.. Yes, sir, I did. 
Q. Now, what did your father say~ 
MR. JONES: I object to that as incompetent. 
* * * * 
THE CO·URT: · I think I will overrule the. ob-
jection and let the witn~es:s answer. 
* * * * 
Q. State what your father said with reference 
to the land that Austin was to receive. 
A. When he was dictating th·e terms. of the Will 
to Mr. Budge he said,· 'That h·e had a piece 
of p-rop1erty below the highway, and he wanted 
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that to go to his son, Austin, and that was to 
be his full share, and no more'." 
12. That the court erred in finding and decreeing 
that Austin Rice was not entitled to the barn and corral 
property situated :across the s'treet from the decreed 
property. 
13. That the court erred in finding and decreeing 
that there were not ten shares of water from Davis 
Creek appurtenant to the deereed land. 
14. That the court erred in finding and decreeing 
that there were only four shares of water ap·purtena.nt 
to the decreed land. 
15. That the court erred in failing to find and de-
cree that the decreed land had app·urtenant to it freshet 
or early waters from Davis Creek before said water 
goes on turns to the extent such high water is avail-
able. 
16. The court erred in finding and holding that 
Erma Rice was not guilty of disception or fraud, and 
that the plaintiff was not misled by her repres·entations. 
17. The court erred in finding and holding that 
Erma Rice .carried out the provisions of her father's 
will, and said finding and holding is contrary to and in 
conflict with other findings and holdings of the court 
heretofore specifically objected to. 
18. That the court erred in holding and finding in 
favor of the defendant, Erma Rice, and against the plain-
tiff, Austin Rice. 
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ARGUMENT 
·We shall discuss first the water right to which 
Austin Rice is entitled under the will of' his father, and 
second the land to which he is entitled under such will. 
Before doing this, we wish briefly to dis-cuss the theo-ry 
under which this case was originally brought. 
THE PETITION, AMENDED PETITION AND 
CO·MPLAINT OF AUSTIN RICE 
0Tiginally, we petitioned the court to amend its 
decree upon the theory that Erma Rice was a trustee 
and that as such trustee she intentionally and for the 
purpose of depriving the petitioner thereof omitted 
from her petition for ·distribution his appurtenant water 
rights and the barn and corral property. The theory 
of this petition was that the executrix was an officer of 
the court, and that if she misrep·resented to the court 
to the detriment of the beneficiaries. whom she was bound 
to protect, the court could correct the wrong regardless 
of whether the fraud was intrinsic or ·extrinsic. The 
authorities which we shall hereafter cite to the court are 
unanimously to this effect, including the decisions from 
this court. 
The trial court sustained a demurrer to this peti-
tion, and we amended to set forth in addition to the 
allegations of the original petition the allegations that 
Erma Rice deliberately deceived the plaintiff and by her 
deception deprived him of his day in court. The amended 
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petition was based only in part upon extrinsic fraud, but 
both petitions were founded upon the theory that the 
executrix misrepresented to the court to the injury of 
the beneficiaries whom she was obligated to protect, and 
to her own advantage. All of the authorities which we 
shall hereafter cite hold that such conduct of an exe-
cutrix or trustee is fraud whether it is called intrinsic 
or extrinsic and will be corrected by the court regardless 
of the label used to describe such conduct. But we also 
submit that despite one finding of the trial court to the 
contrary, the record conclusively shows from Erma's 
own testimony that she erroneously advised Austin of 
the contents of the will and that he relie·d upon her to 
his loss and her gain, and this error was perpetuated in 
the p·etition for and the decree of ·distribution without 
any semblance of hearing on Austin's rights. The 
amended eomp1!aint merely ·called at1tention to the fact 
that Austin Rice didn't get 27 acres of land but got 25 
acres. 
THE WA·TER RIGHT 
By its decision in this case on the former appeal 
this court has already app1roved the contention made by 
the plaintiff that water app:urtenant to land passes· with-
out mention. (See also In re: Johtns:on's Estate, 64 Utah 
114, 228 Pac. 748.) Thus, when the testator devised to 
Austin the land he now oooupies, that devise carried with 
it all water appurtenant to such land. The land decreed 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
54 
to Austin also carried with it all appurtenant water. 
The statute, 100-1-11, U.C.A. 1943, provides as follows: 
''A right to the use of water appurtenant to 
land shall pass to the grantee of such land, and, in 
cases where such right has been exercised in ir-
rigating differ·ent pareels o.f land at different 
times, such right shall pass to the grantee of any 
parcel of land on which such right was exercised 
next preceding the time of the execution of any 
conveyance thereof; subject, however, in all cases 
to payment by the grantee in any such convey-
ance of all amounts unpaid on any ass·essment 
then due upon any such right; provided, that any 
such right to the use of water, or any part there-
of, may be reserved by the grantor in any such 
conveyance by making such reservation in ex-
press terms in such conveyance, or it may be 
separately conveyed.'' 
s~ection 100-1-10 as amended in 1945 reads that when 
water is represented by shares of stock in a corporation, 
it shall not be deemed to be app·urtenant to the land. This 
amendment and p·rDVision of 100-1-11 make it quite clear 
that all water appurtenant to land is transferred with-
out mention except where the water is represented by 
shares of stock in a corporation. The waters of Davis 
Creek are not represented by shares of stock in a cor-
poration. Davis Creek Water Users Company is an 
unincorporated association, ( T. 10). The decree of dis-
tribution, therefore, without mentioning the water de-
creed Austin all water appurtenant to his decreed land, 
as determined by the use at the time the will was made. 
Inasmuch as a dispute arose, it was p·rop·er for the 
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court to clarify its decree and specify definitely the 
"Tater right appurtenant to the decreed land. 
The question of 'vhat water Austin is entitled to may 
be determined 'vithout any reference whatever to the 
question of fraud. The decree of distribution transferred 
the appurtenant water to him, and the only problem with 
reference to the water is to determine what water was 
appurtenant to the decreed land. That water already 
has passed to Austin under the decree of distribution. 
It is not necessary to consider the question of fraud 
or misrepresentation on the part of the defendant with 
reference to the water. Such fraud and misrepresenta-
tion nevertheless exist in legal effect, as we shall here-
after point out. 
It will be noted that the statute provides that where 
a water right has been exercised in irrigating different 
parcels of land at different tim-es, ''such right shall 
pass to the grantee of any parcel qf land on which such 
right was exercised next p·receding the time of the exe-
cution of any conveyance thereof''. It becomes import-
ant, therefore, to determine what water right was used 
on Austin's land next preceding the execution of the 
will in 1944 and also at the time of the testator's death 
in 1945. 
Many of the defendant's witnesses, including the 
defendant herself, testified that no water whatsoever 
was used on Austin's land at any time from Davis Creek 
through the White Ditch. The court did not believe any 
of these witnesses and found that there was water ap-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
56 
purtenant to the land which -could only come from Davis 
Creek through th·e White Ditch. Since the trial court 
refused to believe these witnesses including the defend-
ant, we may do likewise. The remainder of the defend-
ant's witnesses stated that the water from Davis Creek 
was never used on the Austin Rice farm after the same 
went on turns. The court did not believe these witnesses 
but found as indicated that there was a water right 
appurtenant to the decreed land from Davis Creek 
through the White Ditch. 
Erma Rice, the defendant, testified that she knew 
that the deed by which David Rice acquired the decreed 
land carried a definite recital conveying appurtenant 
waters; .that the inventories in the estate matter inven-
toried ·and ap·praised the land with appurtenant water, 
and that she purposely omitted from the petition for 
distribution any reference to waters appurtenant to 
the land to he decreed to Austin, and that she pm~posely 
did not call the omission to the attention of the -court, 
and that the court entered its decree of distribution with-
out having called to its attention by her the foregoing 
facts. It is quite ·clear from the contentions that were 
made at the former hearing of this case when the trial 
court sustained the demurrers, which ruling was re-
versed by this court, that both defendant and her counsel 
assumed that because the will did nO't mention water 
in connection with the land decreed to Austin no water 
' should be decreed to him. This position is erroneous, 
and the water appurtenant to the land did pass to 
Austin under the will. It is undisputed in the record 
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that Erma Rice, the defendant, deliberately intended to 
deprive Austin of any water for use on the decreed land. 
Her excuse for it was that she knew there was no water 
from D-avis Creek ap·purtenant to said land. 'This the· 
trial court finds was not true. Erma Rice states that 
she told Austin that there was no water right. Assume 
that she did and Austin believed her, as she states he 
did, and it later develop·ed, as it has developed, that 
there "\Vas water app·urtenant to the land and that he 
"\Vas entitled to it. Then it follows beyond dispute that 
Erma Rice is asserting to Austin that Austin got no 
'vater under the will was wrong, and if Austin believed 
her, he was misled by her assertion to his injury and 
to her· benefit. Erma Rice along with the other children 
of David L. Rice benefit by her misrepresentation. An 
executrix is also a trustee and .cannot excuse her mis-
representation of a fact upon the plea that she was 
mistaken, and particularly may she not do so when. she 
herself benefits by the misrepresentation at the expense 
of the beneficiary. If a trustee could excuse his mis-
representations upon the ground that he thought they 
'vere true, then the trustee's state of mind and not the 
state of mind of the testator would determine what the 
beneficiaries received under the will. It is no excuse for 
the defendant to say, "I thought I was right, and, there-
fore, I can not be ·charged with misrepresentation, and 
I may keep; what I have secured by such misrepresenta-
tion merely because I thought I was right in making the 
untrue state·ment." In this case Erma Rice admitted 
that she and not the court determined what Austin got 
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under the will. She decided that the decreed land didn't 
have any water right, and she decided that Austin should 
not have the barn and corral property. She assumed 
to interpret the will without calling the facts to the 
court's attention. Erma Rice did not have the right to 
decide what land Austin should receive, nor did Erma 
Rice have the right to decide whether or not he should 
have a water right. When she assumed to make this 
deeision, even though she told Austin that that was all 
he got, she was wrong. She misrepresented to him and to 
the court, and she cannot benefit by it, nor can her ac-
tion go uncorrected whether it be -called intrinsic or ex-
trinsic fraud. 
It was impossible to determine from defendant's 
evidence what wa:ter was appurtenant to the decreed 
land. As indicated above, according to most of her 
witnesses, including the defendant, there was no water 
appurtenant. But some of defendant's witnesses did 
state that during high water season water had been used 
on the decreed tract from Davis Creek. The trial court 
in order to determine the appurtenant water went out-
side of the issues of the case, figured up a hypothetical 
acreage watered by David L. Rice from Davis Creek 
and divided that by the number of hours he had in the 
creek, and by this method concluded that Austin had 
four hours. It was not :an issue in this case as to how 
much water David Rice used on lands other than 
Austin's, nor was it an issue as to how much land David 
L. Rice irrigated from Davis Creek. That issue was 
created entirely by the trial court. In or·der to reach the 
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total acreage of 60 to 70 ac.res north of D:avis Creek 
found by the court to be the land of David Riee watered 
from Davis Creek, it is necessary to include the Glover 
tract, and the testimony is all to the effect that the 
Glover tract when it "\Yas irrigated from Davis Creek was 
only irrigated infrequently, and then only a portion of 
it. There is no evidence whatever that immediately p·re-
ceding the execution of the will or immediately prior to 
the death of David L. Rice any of his 32 hours of water 
were used on the Glover tract, and it is also impossible 
to determine from the record which of his tracts of land 
he watered from Davis Creek during the last few years 
of his life. There is some evidence that at one time 
there was an orchard, but whether this orchard was. 
watered in recent years is not clear, nor is it clear how 
many acres were actually dependent upon Davis Creek. 
Had it been an issue in this case to determin·e what lands 
of David L. Rice were watered from Davis Creek, that 
testimony would have been produced clearly. It may 
even be gleaned from the record that not more than 
30 or 40 acres of David L .. Rice's land were watered from 
Davis Creek. The testimony of LeGrande Rice would 
show anything from 30 acres up to 50 or 60, but Austin 
Rice in his affidavit in support of his motion for a new 
trial calls attention to the fact that the Richards' place 
has two shares of water from Steed Creek, and that the 
80 acres where the new barn is located has water from 
Farmington Canyon; that the Glover field has ten hours 
of water, his, the plaintiff's land has ten hours of water 
' 
and the Rawl Rice place has twelve hours of water from 
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Davis Creek, making the total of 32 hours; that the 
ditch to the north of Davis Creek was not constructed 
until 1920 or 1921, (R. 140, 141). This is not denied. 
Erma Rice denies only part of this affidavit. She ad-
mits that there are two shares for the Richards' fann 
from Steed Creek but says said shares have never been 
used on the Richards' farm, (R. 146). However, that 
was not the issue in this case. The issue in this case was 
what was the water appurtenant to the Austin Rice tract 
at the time David L. Rice made his will. We must look 
elsewhere than to the defendant for this information, 
par'ticularly since the court refus-ed to believe any of the 
defendant's witnesses and did hold that there was some 
water appurtenant to the Austin Rice land. 
David L. Rice himself in 1936 in making his appli-
cation to the State· Engineer, plaintiff's Exhibit "H", 
gives us the most significant evidence in this case. On the 
30th day of January, 1936, David L. Rice applied to 
the State Engine·er for a well which he asserted was com-
m·eneed in 1928 and comp,leted in 1928, and which is 
the well on the southeast corner of the land which was 
never used. He stated that this well was to irrigate nine 
acres of the decreed land. He then makes this signifi-
cant statement: "This well is sup·plement to drain and 
canyon water.'' As late as 1936 David L. Rice asserts 
that he is using the canyon water on the Austin Rice 
plaee for nine acres of land. He acquired this water, as 
we have shown by the abstract, as early as 1902, and 
he was still claiming it in 1936. He had used it all through 
the years. The canyon water the evidence shows without 
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dispute is from Davis Creek through the White Ditch. 
Thos·e ·witnesses of defendant, including the defendant, 
who testified that neither David Rice nor any one else 
had any canyon \Yater for the Austin Rice tract are di-
rectly disputed by David L. Rice himself as late as 1936. 
Both the plaintiff and his wife testified without equivoca-
tion that they had a ten hour water right from 7 :00 Wed-
nesday night to 5 :00 Thursday morning; that they had 
used it every week with the knowledge and consent of 
David L. Rice; that they w·ere using it at the time the 
will was made and at the time of his death; that it was 
necessary in Drder to mature crops on their land, and 
that crops could not be matured on their land without it. 
The amount of land to be irrigated on the Austin 
Rice tract from Davis Cre·ek was estimated by the court 
to be eight acres, (R. 124). D:avid Rice in 1936 said he 
was irrigating nine acres, while Austin Rice and his 
wife stated that they irrigated from eight to twelve acres 
of" garden and orchar·d, the hay crop durmg the entire 
high water season, ·and about one-half of the hay acreage 
from the water shares so long as it lasted, but that later 
in the season when the water was on turns the garden 
and orchard needed it all. There is nothing in the ree-
ord to dispute the testimony of the plaintiff and his wife 
except the defendant's witnesses whom the court did not 
believe. Austin Rice and his wife specifically testified 
that they used the water from 7 :00 Wednesday night to 
5 :00 Thursday morning, and that the ten hours of water 
were used on the meadow hay as abov~e stated in addition 
to nine acres of garden, ( T. 7 4-7 6, 89, .90). There is a 
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distinction between the meadow hay and the alfalfa hay. 
The alfalfa hay does not require as much irrigation from 
Davis Creek, ( T. 75). 
Austin Rice and his wife are supported in their 
-evidence that they used the water from the White Ditch 
during the irrigation season by Clifford Hughes, the 
Secretary of the Davis Creek Water Users Association, 
his brother, Irvin Hughes, and James H. McQuiston. 
Irvin Hughes and McQuiston definitely testified to the 
use by Austin of the Davis Creek water at the time 
nearest th~e making of the will and the death of the 
testator and definitely established that this water was 
used on his farm, was necessary to mature his crops, 
that the erops could not he matured without it, and that 
there was no other place to get wat~er for his farm for 
irrigation than from Davis Creek. These witnesses did 
not specify definitely the hours of the turn, although 
McQuiston positively stated that the turn was at night 
after he, M-cQuiston, got home from work a't the Cudahy 
Plant which would be after 7 :00. ~e had been on the 
Austin Rice farm, helped him irrigate and had gone with 
him up the ditch to get the water, and on various occa-
sions the water was already coming down the ditch at 
the time he got to the Rice farm. It is not difficult tq 
understand why these witnesses didn't know the exact 
hours. None of the witnesses were particularly inter-
ested in Austin Rice's water turn and had no occasion 
whatever to become familiar with it. They only ob-
served it as a neighbor might observe it or as the Hughes 
observed it because of Austin going across their property 
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to take it and see it running do"~n the ditch and onto 
his land, or nlcQuiston who helped to irrigate. The 
White Ditch flows high on the side of the n1ountain. It 
is not visible unless one has occasion to observe it. 
Austin's ~turn \Yas in the middle of the night, and it wourd 
be strange indeed if the neighbors were up high on the 
hill roaming around in the middle of the night to watch 
Austin use his water. However, there is no excuse for 
Erma Rice or her brothers testifying that there never 
was any water used from Davis Creek on the Austin 
Rice tract. The very fact that they would so testify 
makes it imperative to disregard their entire testimony. 
It could be none other than a wilful misrepres-entation 
and when Erma Rice presisted in this not only in her 
petition for distribution but in her answer and at the 
trial her intention to misrepresent is clearly established 
by her actions, regardless of anything she may say to 
the contrary. Actions speak louder than vvords. 
The court believed the plaintiff's witnesses as to 
the fact that there was an appurtenant water right on 
the Austin Rice tract from Davis Creek, but in fixing the 
amount of water at four hours we submit the eourt was 
in error. There is nothing to support that finding except 
a calculation by the court based upon assumed facts. 
which were not in issue and were not, we believe, cor-
rectly evaluated by the trial court. We do not believe 
the record establishes even from the inconclusive testi-
mony on the point that David L. Rice- watered 60 to 70 
acres on the north from Davis Creek and that Austin 
only watered 8. Austin watered from 9 to 12 acres and 
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part of his timothy hay crop·. He US'ed water at will 
during the high water season. David L. Rice, so far 
as we ean speculate, irrigated anY'vhere from 30 acres 
up~ards to the north of Davis Creek. Whether or not 
this irrigation was in the earlieT years or in the late 
years does not appear clearly from the record. The 
court did not decree Austin any of the high "vater ex-
cept four hours. This is clear error. Even som'e of de-
fendant's witness·eS testified that the high water was 
used on the Austin Rice tract at will whenever available. 
The trial court having found that Austin had an ap-
purtenant water right from Davis Creek, had only the 
testimony of Austin and his wife as to the extent of that 
right. The- court having disbelie-ved the defendant's wit-
nesses and having believed the plaintiff's witnesses that 
there was a water right at all times, completely disre-
garding the testimony of Austin and his wife as to the 
extent of that right. Th·ere is no dispute in the record 
that if there is an ap·purtenant water right from Davis 
Creek to the Austin Rice land, that water right is from 
7 :00 Wednesday night to 5 :00 Thursday morning after 
the water goes on turns, and an unlimited right in the 
high water. 
It is ~established that the Austin Rice tract is one-
half or more miles away from the Davis Creek. The 
Davis Creek flows on the high ground to the east of 
the highway, then crosses the road and has to go through 
a dirt ditch south to Austin's. While th·ere is no testi-
mony in the record as to the length of time that it now 
takes the water to go through the White Ditch from 
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Davis Creek, it is a certainty that it '\Vould take it at 
least one-half an hour to one hour to go from the Creek 
to the Austin Rice tract under head. This would leave 
Austin under the court's decree from three to three and 
one-half hours of water to water the entire upper part 
of his farm. The \Yater decreed would be of little or 
no us·e to him at all for that purpose. D·avid L. Rice 
bought the Austin Rice land nearly twenty years before 
the North Ditch was constructed. Erma Rice in her 
affidavit, (R. 146), did not deny or dispute the assertion 
of Austin in his affidavit, (R. 140), that the ditch to the 
north of Davis Creek to supply lands of David L. Rice 
\Vas not constructed until 1920 or 1921. Certainly, p·rior 
to that time David Rice didn't use any waters from 
Davis Creek on his lands to the north and none of the 
water that was appurtenant to the Austin Rice tract, 
lmown as the Stephenson tract, at the time of the pur-
chase. Immediately prior to the making of the will and 
immediately prior to the death of the testator the only 
evidence in the record that water from Davis Creek was 
used on the Austin Rice tract ·for a specified period is 
that it was used from 7:00 Wednesday night to 5 :00 
Thursday morning after the water went on turns and 
at no specified limited time during high water. The court 
having found that there was an app!Urtenant water right, 
we submit, is bound to decree a water right that will he 
appurtenant that is effective for the purpose for which 
water is used and not a dribble that will do no good to 
any one. We submit, having found that there is an ap-
purtenant water right, the only evidence in the ree.ord 
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as to the extent of that watier right is as above indicated 
and that the court should have decreed Austin the water 
from Davis Creek before the same goes on turns when-
ever it is availabl,e, and after the same goes on turns 
from 7 :00 Wednesday night to 5 :00 Thursday morning. 
'THE BARN AND CORRAL PROPERTY 
It becomes important to determine svhat property 
Austin occupied at the time of the execution of the will 
and the death of the testator, David L. Rice. The de-
fendant assumed to determine what that property was, 
and after she had determined it, she reported to the 
court that thaf was the property willed to Austin. As 
we have shovvn, the property actually decreed to him 
comprises 25 plus acres and included in the 25 acres is 
a 3 acre tract acquired by David L. Rice in 1909 and 
located on the south side about the center of the decreed 
property, (P. 10 of Exhibit "B "). 'The defendant in-
cluded this tract of 3 acres and excluded the 3 plus 
acres upon which the plaintiff's barn and corral are 
situated. She ·did the selecting, and she assumed to 
determine wha;t property the testator devised to his son. 
Why she included the 3 acres of p~astur.e }and and ex-
cluded the barn and corral does not appear since both 
are located in Section 31. Since each tract is approxi-
mately the sam-e size as the other, she could have in-
cluded either if her theory was that 27 acres was the 
land devised, instead of the devise being as i't actually 
was, the land now occupied by Austin in Section 31. As 
a matter of fact, she had no right to make any determina-
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tion. That determination w·as made bv the testator, and 
he left .. A .. ustin the land no'v occupied by him in Section 
31. The 25 acres decreed pllls the 3 and a fraction acres 
upon which the barn and corral are situated approxi-
mate 27 acres. Obviously, the determination in the will 
of the land by acreage is expressly only an approxima-
tion, and the devise actually was the land then occup~ied 
by Austin, and the 'vords, '' 27 acres, more or less'', 
are merely descriptive. Since the barn and corral p~ro­
perty plus the decreed land approximate 27 acres, if 
they were occupied by Austin at the time of the making 
of the will and the death of the testator, then that is 
the land decre·ed 'tio him, and when the ·defendant deliber-
ately omitted that land in her petition for distribution 
and deliberately told Austin, as she herself said ·she did, 
that he was not devised that land, her action -vvas fraudu-
lent, if in fact Aus!tjjn did occupy the corral and barn 
property. The evidence ,concerning the barn and corral 
property is all one way. The court found that Austin 
and his father jointly used the barn and corral property, 
but specifically found that it was not occupied by 
.Aiustin as a part of the approximately 27 acres at the 
date of the will, and that the said property is not an es-
sential or necessary part of plaintiff's farm, (R. 125). 
These findings are directly contrary to the evidence. 
There is some evidence that David L. Riee did use the 
corral property to run some of his cattl~e, and the de-
fendant's witnesses, some of them, attempted to give 
the impression that David Rice used the property joint-
ly with Austin. However, none of defendant's witnesses 
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nor did the defendant testify that at the time of the 
making of the will David Rice vvas using the barn and 
the corral property. Rawl S. Rice testified that he was 
familiar \Vith this P'roperty prior to 1928 and that's all 
he testified to. James S. Rice didn't testify to anything 
with reference to this property. LeGrande Rice stated 
that his father and Austin kept cattle and hay in the 
barn; that his father repaired the barn twice, but he 
couldn't say when it was, hut it was two years after 
Austin went on there in 1937 which would be in 1939. 
He didn't know whether Austin had kept up the pro-
p·erty or not, but Austin and his wife did help to keep 
up the fences and repair them. His father and Austin 
fed some ca;ttle there together. He could not say whether 
or not Austin was paid for doing this. He said that 
Austin kept his eattle, his fa.rm n1achinery and his hay 
on the prop,erty, and that he had no other place to keep 
them. Rawl Rice, the grandson, didn't know anything 
about the p~roperty from 1942 to 1946. He was not 
present when the will was written nor when David Rice 
died. He did say, however, tha:t while he was on the 
property Austin kept hay and eattle there as did also 
his grandfather, hut he doesn't know whether or not the 
grandfather paid Austin for keeping the stock. Austin 
had no other pWace to keep~ his eattle or hay. Valance 
C. Glover had seen David Rice use the barn and corral 
property but no specific times were mentioned except 
that David Rice was around the property on and off 
up until the time of his death. Of course, this was not 
disputed. This witn.ess did say he couldn't tell the years, 
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but he rented a piece of land right across from the barn 
around 1930 to 1940. Lately he hasn't been there so 
much. He hadn't been up there the last two or thre·e 
years. Austin kept his cattle, horses and hay in th·e 
barn. The barn could have been used part for Austin and 
part for David L. Rice, but he guess-ed they stacked the 
hay separate. Erma Rice, the defendant, said she told 
A~ustin that his father left him the property below the 
road but not the barn. Under her own evidence she ad-
vised Austin that under the will he didn't get the barn 
and that she intentionally omitted any refer~nce to the 
barn in the petition for distribution. Erma Rice, how-
ever, testified that at the tin1e he-r fa;ther died none 
of his cattle or hay were on the barn or corrol pro-
perty; that they were all elsewhere. So all of defend-
ant's witneS'ses who testified on the subject stated that 
Austin kept his cattle, hay and farm implements at all 
times on the barn and corral property, and that he had 
no other place to ~eep them. Defendant's own witnesses 
dispute the finding of the trial court that Austin didn't 
occupy the land and that it was not an essential part of 
his farm. That Austin did not occupy the land jointly 
with his father is undisputed. Austin stated that after 
he moved onto the property, his father ran some of 
his -cattle there but never without consultation with 
Austin; that his father paid him for any hay used; that 
when his father's cattle ran in the corral his father gave 
Austin pe·rmission to. run his cattle on the mountain 
land above. Austin and his wife testified that 4 or 5 years 
before he di·ed David L. Rice built a new barn to the 
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north and after that, he never kept any hay or cattle 
on the Austin Rice property. This testimony is undis-
puted. No witnesses testified that at the time of the 
making of the will David L. Rice was using the barn 
and corral property at all. He had removed all of his 
oa~tle and hajy to the new barn and at the time of the 
making of the will Austin Rice had exclusive possession 
of the barn and corral property, but under all the evi-
dence it is -conclusive that Austin did occupy the barn 
and corral property, and that he had no other place for 
his hay, cattle or farm i1nplements. The court is clearly 
in error in holding that Austin did not occupy the barn 
and corral property at the time of the making of the 
will. 
The court permitted the defendant over plaintiff's 
objection to testify what her father said to Mr. Budge 
the day before the will was signed about what land 
Austin was to receive, ( T. 233, 234, 235). We submit 
this was clear error. Our statute, 102-2-2, is in line with 
the general rule that ora.l~declaration of the testator can-
not be used to determine his intentions; that his inten-
tions are to be ascertained from the words of the will. 
In order to determine what land .Austin occupied there 
was no necessity to have the ·defendant testify what her 
father said to Mr. Budge when he was dictating the 
terms of his will. The presump,tion would be that Mr. 
Budge wrote into the will what the testator dictated. 
There is not one wor:d in the will that Austin is to re-
ceive a piece of testator's lan~d below the highway. 
In relating the oonversa tion with her father the defend-
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ant said nothing to the effect that her father said Austin 
was to receive the land he no\v oecupies. If her testi-
mony is to be believed, then nir. Budge con1pletely failed 
to follow the testator's directions. The will reads that 
Austin is to receive the land he now occupies, ·and no 
instruction of this kind appears from the supposed con-
versation with the testator. It cannot be assumed that 
the trial court ignored this erroneous, revidence since the 
trial court's findings are ,directly supported by this 
erroneous and incompetent evidence, and it is impossible: 
to determine how much this incompetent ~evidence in-
fluenced the trial court, and, therefore, the reception 
of this evidence was prejudicial error. Ho\vever, since 
it so clearly appears without dispute that Austin did 
occupy the barn and corral p-roperty, we submit that 
this court should direct the correction of the findings, 
conclusions and decr1ee and that the abov~e stated in-
competent evidence is only another ground for demon-
strating the error of the trial court. 
The mere fact· that at sometime some of David L. 
Rice's cattle were in the corral does not establish that 
Austin was not oecupying the property. The record also 
shows that David L .. Rice used Austin's decreed land for 
the planting of sugar beets when Austin had the pro-
perty. As a matter of fact, David L. Rice owned all the 
land until his death and could haVre ·done with it as 
he pleased. It was not a question of whether David L. 
Rice made any use of the p·rope-rty. The- question is, 
what property did. Austin occupy at the time of the 
making of the will and the death of the testator, and that 
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he occupied the barn and corral property is established 
without dispute. It is further ·established without dis-
put that after David L. Rice built the new barn four or 
five years before his death he never did use the barn and 
corral property. Some of the witnesses tried to give 
the impression that David L. Rice stored hay in the 
barn that was hauled from Kaysville, but Austin Rice 
stated that th~e hay from Kaysville was hauled into his 
father's barn and into the barn "\Vhere he now is upon 
instructions from his father, and his father gave him 
his share of the hay on shares, but he, Austin Rice, 
brought a check to his father from the Smith Canning 
Company and gave it to him, and the father said: "I 
want to give it back to ·you. You ought to have it all, 
but I have got to have more than 1;2 of it", (T. 252, 253). 
Erma Rice did not dispute this, nor did any one else. 
In his decision the trial court indicates that because the 
:father didn't give the barn and -corral property to the 
plaintiff in his lifetim·e the plaintiff, therefore, cannot 
recover, regardless of the question of whether or not 
he occupied the property. The trial eourt says that the 
father allowed the plaintiff to us·e the barn and corral 
and exercised the control over it. The father also only 
allowed the plaintiff to use the other prop·erty and the 
water. All of it was the property of th·e father during 
the father's lifetime. He never gave any of it to the 
plaintiff. The controlling question is not whether the 
~ather gave th·e prop-erty to the p~laintiff in his lifetime 
or whether the father exercised any control over the 
property during his lifetime because the evidence shows 
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that the father owned and exercised control over all of 
the property and the water. There is no evidence in the 
record that the father exercised control over the corral 
any different than he did over the other propeTty. Plain-
tiff and his wife are not disputed by any one that the 
father never used the corral after plaintiff went on the 
land without consulting· with the plaintiff, and that the 
father's use of the corral ceased absolutely long be-
fore his death. 
It would have been just as proper for the defend-
ant to leave out the three acres of pasture land and in-
clude the barn and corral p-roperty as it was for her 
to leave out the barn ~nd corral property and include 
the three acres of pasture land. All of the property was 
one n1enage. There was no division. The plaintiff oc-
cupied it all, and all of it together approximates 27 acres 
in Section 31. We submit that the trial court was in 
error in ruling as he ·did, ·and that his m·emorandum deci-
sion indicates clearly that his basis for decision was. 
entirely erroneous. 
THE LAW WITH REFERENCE TO 
PLAINTIFF'S RIGHTS 
In her proposed findings of fact the plaintiff en-
deavor·e·d to have the trial court find that the def·endant 
read the will to the plaintiff and that he expressed satis-
faction with the provision made for him. We objected to 
this p-roposed finding which was· in paragraph 14 of the 
proposed findings, and the court allowed our objec-
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tion, and it was stricken from the actual findings and 
does not appear in them, ( R. 138) . The trial court, 
therefore, did not believe the ·defendant's testimony that 
she rend the will to 'the P'laintiff. The p·}aintiff and his 
vvife testified tha't they ·did no't read the will and only 
knew what was in it from the statements of Erma Rice. 
The trial court apparently believed this. As we have 
already pointed out, if Austin actually occupied the barn 
and corral prop,er'ty, and if there was actually 
water ap·purtenant to the decreed land, (as the court 
found there was), then defendant from her own testi-
mony was guilty of misrepresentation when she told 
Austin that he got no water nor the barn and corral 
land,· and if he believed her and suffered a loss as a 
consequence, her action may he corrected whetheT it is 
called extrinsic or intrinsic fraud, and particularly sinc.e 
she benefited from it. 
The lengths to which the defendant and her brothers 
wer'e willing to go to benefit at Austin's expense is 
indicated from their testimony. Not only did they testify 
that the decreed land had no water right from Davis 
Creek which the court disbelieved, but they went ahead 
with the fantastic story about how the Austin Rice land 
was watered from the drains by plugging up the drains, 
etc. The trial court went out to the p·roperty and viewed 
it and saw how untrue this testimony was and how im-
possible it would be to irrigate Austin's land with these 
drains. To do so would not only require water to run 
uphill since the drains are all lower than the irrigated 
lands, but would have required a constant and contin-
uous digging up and plugging up of the drains according 
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to the witnesses then1selves. The defendant proposed 
in her proposed findings of fact, paragraph No. 10, to 
have the eourt. find that the land was irrigated in this 
peculiar n1anner. W·e objected to any such finding. The 
court agreed with us and struck it out (R. 138), and 
that finding does not appear in the court's findings. 
Obviously, the court didn't believe ·either the defendant 
or any of her witnesses on this point ·or on the point that 
there was no appurtenant water from Davis Creek, nor 
did he believe the defendant when she said Austin w~as 
entirely satisfied after reading the will to reeeive only 
the decreed land without water. Under these circurn.-
stances, it is impossible to sustain the court's finding 
that the defendant did not intend to deceive the court 
or defraud the petitioner; the finding that Austin did 
not -occupy the 3.85 acres; that the defendant did not 
know that Austin -claimed water from Davis Creek; 
that Erm·a Rice did not at any time misrepresent any 
facts or conditions whatsoever to Austin Rice. They are 
in conflict with the testimony and with the court's find-
ing No. 6 that Erma Rice told the court in her petition 
for distribution that the decreed land without water 
was all that Austin was left unde·r the will. The court 
expressly found that there was appurtenant water. 
Erma Rice told the court ther~e was no appurtenant 
water and persist·ed in this evidence throughout the 
trial. Erma Rice intended to deprive Austin Rice of 
any water. The court gave him four hours. That was 
fraud and misrepresentation on the part of Erma Rice 
and affirmatively appears not only from the evidence 
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but from the court's finding N-o. 6. The evidence estab-
lishes without dispute that Austin occupied th·e barn 
and corral property and that he had no other place· to 
ke:ep his cattle, hay and farm implements. That property 
and the property across the street was all one menage 
and used and occupied by Austin at !all times and used 
exclusively by hiffi for severaJ years before his father's 
death. Erma Rice told the court and intended to tell 
the court that Austin Rice did not occupy this property. 
That was not true, and if she told Austin that under 
the will he got no wa.ter nor the barn aJld -corral prop-
erty, that was untrue, and if he relied upon her, her 
legal fraud and mis.repres·entation just as effectively 
deprived him of his property ·as if she had done so with 
the intention to defraud. 
We brought this action as we have already pointed 
out, upon the theory that the action of a trust:ee, and 
an executrix is a trustee, who misrepresents a fact 
wherehy the court is ·deceived and the beneficiary suffers, 
and particularly where the trustee benefits can always 
be set aside whether the conduct be denominated mis-
take, negligence, p·erjury, actual or constructive fraud. 
Her good faith is not an element to he considered. A 
fiduciary cannot make repreHentations which are in fact 
untrue or only partially true and defend upon the plea 
that he did not know that they were untrue or only 
partially true, or that he believed them to be true or 
interpose any other defense if the statements are in fact 
untrue in whole or in part. Erma Rice is estopped from 
raising any of these defenses. However, the lo\ver court 
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sustained a demurrer to this petition, and 've amended 
to plead extrinsic fraud specifically. vV·e amended but 
never abandoned our theory ··w·hich we submit was estab~ 
lished by the evidence beyond dispute. The overwhelm-
ing majority of courts including this court sustain the 
foregoing principles. 
We also submit that because of the conduct of the 
defendant the issu·es between plaintiff and defendant 
were never presented to any court until they were h·eard 
in the p·resent hearing; that beeaus.e of the conduct of 
the ·defendant ther·e has never be·en any adversary pro-
ceedings between the defendant and the plaintiff and 
plaintiff's rights were never presented to any- court until 
this hearing. Under the decision of this court in this 
case that entitles the plaintiff to maintain his action. 
Defendant's belief, knowledge or intention, whether good 
or bad, .are not the basis of plaintiff's rights. In assum-
ing to decide what the plaintiff got under the \vill 
defendant attempted to usurp th·e court's functions 
and determine petitioner's rights for herself. Plaintiff 
is not bound by any such -conduct no matter how innocent 
it is claimed to he. As a matter of fact, the court's do 
not attempt to determine whether the fraud is ·extrin-
sic or intrinsic under circumstances such ·a:s we have here 
' ' 
and some :of ~them even g-o so far -a:s to say that if i't is. ne-
cessary to denominate the action as fraudulent, it will be 
called extrinsic if a fi·duciary is involved, and all of them 
say tha.t the label attached to the fiducrary's conduct is 
no't im.p·ortant, whether i~t he called mistake, negligence, 
fraud, error, or what not. In the decision in the pr·esent 
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case the Supreme Court quotes with ~approval the lead-
ing ·case on the ~subj~ect 'Of extrinsic fraud, U. S. vs. 
Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61, 65, 25 L. Ed. 93, wherein 
the Supreme Court o.f the United States discusses ex-
trinsic fraud as involving various situations where 
''there has never been a real contest in the trial or 
a hearing of the case,'' as ''reasons for which a new 
suit may be sustained to set aside and ignore the for-
Iner judginent or decree, and open the ease for a new 
and fair hearing''. 
The authorities which we shall h~ereinafter cite all 
hold tha;t under the doctrine of the Throclanorton case 
if it is a beneficiary who has been injured hy the act of 
his trustee in failing fully and frankly to disclose to the 
court or the beneficiary all material facts, a judgment 
obtained under such a situation will be s·et aside whether 
the ground is mist:ake, negligence, perjury or because 
of fraud whether the fraud be ealled intrinsic or ex-
trinsic. 
''The general rule is that the failure to per-
form the ·duty to make disclosures which res:ts 
upon one because of a trust or confidential rela-
tion constitutes fraud sufficient for a court of 
equity to relieve against the judgment. This 
conclusion -could be based upon one of two 
theories, namely, that the fraud involved is of 
an extrinsic nature, or that the fact that the 
guilty p:arty is .a fiduciary makes an ,exception to 
the rule requiring the fraud to he extrinsic. Mos:t 
courts simply ·declare th·e rule without discussing 
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the kind of fraud involved.'' 31 Am. J ur. Sec. 
67 -!, page 241. 
There seen1s to be no dissent to the foregoing rule. 
The authorities are uniforn1 that an executrix or admin-
is'tra tor is a trus\tee, and the heirs 'are the beneficiaries 
of the estate. 21 An1. J ur. pp. 370, 371, sec. 4, p·p. 37 4, 
375, sec. 8, 9. The defendant is still the executrix, the. 
·estate never having been closed or terminated as pro-
vided by 102-12-19 U.C.A. 1943, or otherwise, and in her 
capacity as an express trustee by the will, sh·e is under 
the same jurisdiction of the same court. 102-12-31 U.C.A. 
1943. Erma Rice is trustee both by the express terms 
of the will and by virtue of her office as ·executrix. ~fany 
of the following cases involve administrators. or exe-
cutors and hold them without he·sitation to be truste·es. 
A trustee will not be permitted to e~cus-e an actual viola-
tion of his trust whether intentionally or unintentionally 
particularly where he benefits at the expense of the bene-
ficiary. 
Our court early recognized the foregoing rule in the 
case of Benson v.s. Anderson) 10 Utah 135. That case is 
in many respects analogous to the case at bar. The de-
fendant was administr•ator of the estate of the plaintiff's 
deceased husband. He had a Decree of Distribution 
entered distributing all of the p~:vop~erty to himself. He 
was a brother of the deceased. The p·1aintiff had notice 
of all court proceedings, no appeal was. t~aken from the 
Decree of Distribution and 'the time for appeal had ex-
pired when the action was brought. The p~laintiff de~-
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pended wholly upon others for information as to her 
rights. Our Supreme Court held that the DHcree of 
Distribution -could be reviewe·d and set aside if the same 
had been obtained by either fraud or mistake that had 
worked a positive injury. Citing Porn. Eq. Jur., S·ec. 919, 
the Supreme Court said that if the· probate court was 
laboring under a mistake as to the fa:cts or the law or 
was fradulerrtly imposed upon the Decree must be set 
aside. The court S'ays ''we have no doubt, however, that 
the p·rbbate court was laboring under some such mis-
take; and whatever the mistake was it was of a vital 
character as it effectually de:prived plaintiff of the home 
where she lived.'' The Court. s.et aside the Decree of 
Distribution and refused to allow the administrator to 
profit by his breach of trust. The Utah case is cited 
with approval by the S·upreme Court of California in 
the case of Bohler vs. Bohler, 67 Pac. 282. The Sohler 
case is one of the le,ading eases supporting the citation 
from Am. Jur. supra. In that case the Sup~r,eme Court of 
California held that although judgments obtained by 
false and perjured ·evidence will not usually be set aside 
since that constitutes intrinsic fraud, if the intrinsic 
fraud is committed by an executrix the Tule does not 
apply. The C·alifornia court exp;ressly held th:at the exe-
cutrix was a trustee for all of the heirs as well as the 
mother of the minor plaintiffs. As such it was her solemn 
duty tb- s-ee that each h·eir secured exactly what he was 
entitled to and if by her false and perjured evidence the 
heirs were defrauded, such fraud was sufficient to set 
aside the Decree of Distribution. As a matter of fact 
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the court said that her concealment fron1 the minor chil-
dren 'vas fraud extrinsic to the case, it prevented their 
being properly represented or from being represented 
at all. In the case at bar, the defendant's failure to dis-
close to the plaintiff that she intentionally omitted his 
''tater and his barn and corral property from her p·eti-
tion was itself fraud ,extrinsic to the case. In California 
the probate ·court has exclusive jurisdiction over the dis-
tribution of estate property so the equity court could 
only adjudge that the person improp1erly decreed the lanq 
should be held as a trustee for the plaintiffs and be re-
quired to account to the plaintiffs for the value thereof 
in the event the specific property could not be ret.urne·d. 
There is no such limitation upon the power of this 
co11:rt in this state. That question was settled by the 
appeal in this. very matter. In the case of Lawn vs. Kipvp, 
145 N.W. 183, the vVisconsin S·upren1e Court expressly 
held that one who sustains the relation of a. trustee to 
another and fails to disclose all matter pertaining to the 
trust to the injury of the other is guilty of fraud; that 
the duty exists independently of any judicial proceedings 
and if the failure to disclose continues into the judicial 
proceedings that is :extrinsic fraud under the rule of the 
Throckmorton case, supra. The court quoted the familiar 
maxim '' Th·ere is no wrong, a hove- infr~ctions of mere 
moral obligations, without a judicial remedy.'' The 
court further s~aid that although Bound judicial policy 
require~s that litigation shall come to a final determina-
tion, the end sought is justice. ''The real p·rinciple o.f 
the adjudications is that the power of equity to relieve 
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against unconS'ciona.ble judgments will not be strictly 
confined to such as are char~acterized by fr'aud extrin-
sic. * * * * * * But where there is a solemn duty to 
s.peak, indep~enden tly of coercion, ·and in a judicial con-
troversy as well, w~hether asked to S'P'eJak or not, and 
there is a failure to speak, resulting in the enrichment 
of the wrongdoer and the imp:overishment of the one to 
whom that duty is owing, there is a fraud ·of most ser-
ious nature, and, in ~a sense, both intrinsic and extrin-
sic.'' ( ~talies throughout the brief are added.) Because 
of the particul~ar relations of respondent to appellant 
the trustee would not be allowed to pr:ofit by his fraud 
whether the same be called extrinsic ·or intrinsic. 
In Lar~abee vs. T.racy, 126 Pac. 2d. 947, the Cali-
fornia Court expressly held that an ex!ecutor or adminis-
trator ·occupies a position of highest trust and confidence 
not only to creditors and beneficiaries of an estate but 
to the court ~as well and is required to act in entire good 
faith. In that oas1e the ·executor argued, as. does the de-
fendant here, that the heir had no right to rely upon 
him and could have ~ascertained the true facts by an in-
vestigation of his own and that any fraud p~erpetrated 
was intrinsic. The court s~aid: 
''But quite apart from the extrinsic fraud, 
the trial court was justified in vacating the order 
and decree on the ground that the executor had 
not made to the court a full and f.air ·disclosure 
of rights of resp·ondent. * * * Whether a failure 
of this obligation of the executor to the -court as 
an officer of it may be classed as extrinsic or 
intrinsic fraud, or an exception to the rule of in-
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trinsic fraud it is nevertheless well established 
' . that it is a fraud upon the court- and requ1r~es no 
specific label (Cites note, 5 A.L.R. 672 which note 
is also cited in the quotation from Am. J ur., 
supra). Here the executor in his cap~acity of 
residuary legatee was unjustly enriched by the 
construction placed by the court upon the will 
upon his ex parte showing, to the impoverishment 
of the legatee entitled to her legacy. It was. a 
fraud of the most serious natur•e. It involved not 
only .a breach of fiduciary duty t·o the respondent 
but a breach of duty to the court.'' Page 953. 
This case was appealed t·o the Supr,eme Court of 
California which in its very recent affirming decision, 
134 Pac. 2d. 265, answered many if not all of the ques-
tions in the case at bar. The Supreme Court of California 
said in answer to the executor's contention that he erron-
eously believed the things he asserted t,o he true, that 
this did not excuse· his conduct. The court held that 
the fact th-at he had m·ade :representations which were 
untrue even thou.gh he erroneously believed them to be 
true, constituted extrinsic fraud. The California Court 
also said, as did the Utah Court in B~enson vs. Anderson 
case, supra, that either fl'1aud or mistake was sufficient 
ground for equitable relief from a judgment secured by 
such fraud or mistake. The California Court further 
said that the executor had a ·clear ·duty to refrain from 
taking an unfair advantage of the impression he had 
created. "An executor has numerous fiduciary obliga-
tions to the beneficiaries of the estate. * * * 'The rela-
tion between an executor or administrator and the lega-
tees and distribute-es like that between the trustee and 
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beneficiaries of the trust, is a fiduciary relation' ". The· 
court also approved the holding that extrinsic fraud or 
mistake exists where the p·robate ple,adings had under-
stated the amount of a legacy and the legatee, relying 
upon the executor's statements, fails to appear at the 
distribution. (page 269) That statement states exactly 
the case at bar. The Court called attention to the fact, 
which is likewise p·rese:nted in the ease at bar, that in 
addition to occupying a relation of trust towards the 
legatee, the executor also was himself a beneficiary under 
the -vvill ; that there was extrinsic fraud if the p1revailing 
party benefited by 'a breach of fiduciary duty and that 
recovery would be allowed whether the fraud be re-
garded as extrinsic, an exception to the extrinsic fraud 
rule or because of mistake. Another California case is 
Puringt1on vs. D'yson, 65 Pac. 2nd. 777, also decided unan-
imously by the Supreme Court of California. In that 
case the court pointed out that because ·an executor was 
involved, the mere fact that the executor kept the heir 
in ignorance of the trust situation (as did the executor 
here) the fraud was such as to entitle the heir to equit-
able relief. The court said it made no difference what 
the motive of the e~ecutor was, if in fact his actions de--
prive an heir of her rightful share in the estate. The 
defense was made in that ease, as was attemp~ted in the· 
cas-e at bar, that the fraud was not e~trinsic. The Su-
preme Court of Calirornia considered that as not con-
trolling. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Kauff-
man vs. McLaughlirn, 114 Pac. 2nd. 929, wherein 
the court says ''When ~a relation of trust or confidence 
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exists, making it the duty of defrauder in th·e trust ea-
pacity to disclose the true state of facts, the defrauded 
party is not charged with -eonstructive ·discovery of the 
fraud on account of the facts being a matter of publie 
record." The court quotes with ap~proval Laurn vs. Kiipvp, 
supra. 
:\Ir. Justice Rutledge, just prior, to his elevation to 
the s.upreme Court of the United States, speaking for 
the United States Court of Ap·peals for the District of 
Columbia in Earll vs. Picken, 113 Fed. 2nd. 150, ap-
proved principles of law decisive in this cas·e. There a 
trustee under a deed of trust was the defendant. One of 
his defenses was that he acted in good f.aith and in an 
honest belief that he was right. He was not permitted, 
however, to use this ~argument to profit at the expense 
of the cestui que trust. He was not ~permitted to do as 
defendant contends, she should he permitted to ·do in 
the ease at bar. She s~ays : ''I thought I was right and 
that ends the matter even though in fact I was. wrong. 
I didn't do it wrongfully so I mus.t keep~ what I got." 
It ""ould be a s:a;d state of affairs if a person eould thus 
hoist him8elf by his own hoot strap~s ~and say because 
he didn't know he was wrong he is. blameless and his 
ignorance or negligence or call it what you may en-
titles him to keep what he in his ignorance· or negligence 
'\Vrongfully acquired. A trustee is not p·ernritted to pro-
fit by his -own ignorance, oorlessness. or lack of informa-
tion. The revers:e is true. It is his ·duty to lmow that 
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all he speaks is the truth. As 1fr. Justice Rutledge says 
( p'age 156) : 
"He ·cannot commingle his trusteeship with 
merchandizing on his own account. No device of 
concealment, whether in the use of straw men or 
otherwise, can ligitimate such miscegenation.'' 
He further says, ''Earll honestly may have 
thought that he was acting within the law. But he 
intended to make a p~rofit at the ·expense of his 
beneficiaries. * * * He eannot retain it, the fruit 
of his effort to make a p1rofit which he was dis-
qualified to accept.'' 
Earll's honesty was immaterial if in fact he 
was wrong. 
Justice R.utledg.e further states ''No half-
hearted diselosure -or partial discovery is suffi-
cient in either resp·ect. The trustee's duty o.f 
disclosure is not discharged by le!aving the cestui 
to draw ·doubtful inferences, conclusions and sus-
picions from his effort to extract for his own 
benefit not only the trust res but other pToperty 
of the beneficiary as well.'' 
In that case the beneficiary had actually been the de-
fendant in the court proceedings but had defaulted be-
cause he did not think that he! had a ehance to prevail. 
The eourt, however, held that this did not bar him from 
later setting aside· the judgment obtained by the trustee 
to his -own advantage. The argument was made that the 
fraud was intrinsic under the Thr·ockmort:on case but 
Mr. Justice Rutledge disposes of that -contention ~on page 
158 by stating that wheithe.r the fraud was intrinsic or 
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extrinsic the result was secured by a trustee's failure to 
perfor1n his duty. He says it \\'"ould be a strange law 
which would allow the trustee to take advantage of the 
ignorance of :the cestui to secure an invulnerable judg·-
ment. He says: 
"The crux of the matter is that defendant's 
violation of the ·dutv of dis-closure continued until 
after the judgment was obtained and satisfied. 
(rrhat is the situation in the ease at har.) Its ef-
fects were not overcome, as has been said, by 
· plaintiff's mere suspicions. (In the case at bar 
the plaintiff was not even suspicious until defend-
.ant thought it was too late for plaintiff to do 
anything about it.) In such cirmtmst:ances it is 
immaterial whethe.r· the fraud be reg·arded as 
extr·ilnsic or ·as am exoe:ptmon to the imvnirnsic frwu.d 
rrule," quoting 3 Freeman, Judgments 5th Edi-
tion 1925, Sec. 1235 and the note in 5 Am. L. R. 
672, Am. Jur. sup.ra as follows: 
''The failure to perform the duty to speak 
or make disclosures which rests. upon one because 
of a trust or -confidential relation is obviously a 
fraud for which equity may afford relief from a 
judgment thereby obtained, .even though the 
bre1ach of duty OC(JIJ)rs during .a ju,dicial ·p:roce,ed-
ing and involves false testi.mony and this is true 
whether such fraud be regarided as extrinsic or as 
an exception to the extrinsic fraud Tule.'' -
In· concluding his decision Justice Rutledge 
says, ''In disposing of the case as we have done, 
we recognize that the defendant may have been 
free, subjectively, from deliberate intention to 
perp,etrate 'a fraud and that he may have regarde·d 
each step :in his conduct as entirely within the 
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law. * * * That he may have intended no fraud 
does not overcome the fact that one has heen 
committed. '' 
The Circuit Court of A·pveals, 7th Circuit, in Fergu-
son vs. W~achs, 96· Fed. 2nd. 910, app·roved by Justice 
Rutledge in the case jus.t quoted likewise quotes with ap-
proval the statement from Freeman on :fudgments. That 
court also adds : 
"and the foregoing propos.ition applies with 
sp·eeial force when the p·arties remaining silent 
owe a special duty to disclose the facts to the 
very eourt in which the cause is being heard; and 
it comes within th·e general test indicated by the 
following language in United States vs. Throck-
morton: '=K• * * these, and similar cases which show 
that there has never been a real contest in the 
trial or hearing of the case, are reasons. for which 
a new suit may be sus·tained to set aside and 
annul the former judgment or deeree, and open 
the case for a new and fair hearing.' '' 
The Circuit Court of Appeals. of the 8th Circuit in 
Fiske vs. Budjer, 125 Fed. 2nd. 841, said that mistake 
of law was no defense to a rep,reS:entation or a position 
which was in fact wrong. ''If the fraud really p~revents 
the complaining party from making a ·full and fair de-
fense it will justify setting :aside a decree, whether ex-
trinsic or intrinsic'', where there is a confidential or 
fiduciary relationship. 
The Supreme Court of California in another case 
Olivera v.s. G~aoe, 122 P~ac. 2nd. 564, again recognizes 
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that mistake a.s well as fraud ''is a recognized ground f,or 
the intervention of equity where the mistake has pre-
vented a fair adversary hearing.'' 
It is uniformly established that mistake, fraud and 
even perjured evidence will be sufficient to set aside a 
judgment p~rocured by such mistake, fraud or :perjured 
evidence, where· a fiduciary relationship exists and it is 
immaterial whether extrinsic or intrinsic. 
Aside from fiduciary considerations, if rals.e repre-
sentations ~are in fact the moving c:ause of ~action hy 
another, neither ignorance, mistake nor good faith ex-
cuses the wrong. 
The Supreme Court of the United St1ates. in Equi-
table Life Insuranoe Q,o. vs. H.alsey, Svua,;rt ·and Comp~avny, 
312 U. S. 410, 85 L. Ed. 920, ap·proved as the law of Iowa 
the do-ctrine that if a person relies upon representations 
to his injury ·an~d they are untrue it is immaterial that. 
such person did not make his own investigation to as-cer-
tain "\Vhether they were untrue or not and it is also im-
material and no defense th~t the person making the 
representations relied upon information which he he~ 
lieved to be true but· had t'aken no effort to verify. The 
cases are uniform that even in the abs·ence of ~a fiduciary 
relationship, it is constructive fraud to make an assertion 
of a f,aet to be true when it _is not tru,e, re:gard1ess of 
whether or not the person making the assertion believed 
it to be true. 
The Supreme Court of the United States in Cio,0 p,er 
vs. Schlesinger, 28 L. Ed. 382 (U. S. 111) approved nearly 
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60 years ago the doctrine that ''It is not necessary, to 
constitute a fraud, that a man who makes a false state-
ment should know preeisely th·at it is false. It is enough 
if it be false and if he made it recklessly and \vithout an 
honest belief in its truth or without reasonable ground 
for believing it to be true, and be made deliberately and 
in such a way as to give the person to whom it is 
1nade reasonable ground for supposing that it was meant 
to be acted upon, and has been acted upon by him ac-
cordingly. * * * * The jury were p~roprerly instructed, 
that a statement recklessly made, withou:t knowledge of 
its truth, was ·a false statement knowingly made, within 
the settled rule.'' 
If one makes representations ·as did the defendant 
in her Petition for Distribution and as she also made to 
Austin Rice, and he relies upon those statements and 
:it turns out that her representations are false it is no 
defense that she believed them to be true nor can she 
assertthat he had no right to rely on them. Morrow vs. 
Bonebr,ake, 115 Pa:c. 2nd. 585 (Kans~as). 
Kathan vs. Comstock, 122 N.W. 1044 (Wisconsin), 
TiJlestern M(JJYI!Ikf.act·urimg Co. vs. ·C1otton and Long, 104 
S.W. 758 (Kentucky), Ma)r;y Pickford Oo. vs. Bayley 
Brothers, 86 Pac. 2nd. 102 (Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia). In the last ease the Sup·reme Court of California 
w:as dealing with only an imp1ie·d rep·resentation and 
said ''If this implied representation is f,als·e, then it is a 
negligent misrepresentation which is an actionable 
fraud.'' In the Wisconsin ease the Supreme Court of 
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Wisconsin states that whether ther;e was moral turpitude 
or not was immate-rial; that if one in dealing with 
another makes misrep~resentations of a fact ma:terial to 
the transaction the transaction may be voided on the 
ground of fraud ,even though it is a "mer;e mistake of 
f.act,-and may have the aid of equity jurisdiction to 
that end. It is not a sufficient answer to the claim of 
such other for such ·person to say he m~a:de the repre-
sentations honestly, for it is, in law and e:quity, as r'e-
gards avoiding such a transaction, his duty to know 
whereof he speaks, or not to speak at all,as of his knowl-
edge.'' The eourt also holds that the rule that the per-
son deceived may act up~on the faith of the r'epresent,a-
tions of the other without blame to himself ''is so ele-
mentary that we will treat it as a matter not requiring 
extended discussion in this opinion.'' 
Upon the p~oint that Austin could have found out 
the truth himself and had no~ right to rely on defendant, 
the Kentucky eourt quotes Mr. Pomeroy to the effect 
that ''The mere existence of opportunities for examina-
tion, or of sources of information, is not sufficient, even 
though by means of these opportunities and sources, in 
the absence of any representation at all, a constructive 
notice to the party would be inferred. The doctrine of 
constructive notice ~does not ap;ply where there has been 
such a rep~resentation o.f fact." This rule would apply 
here in any event beeause of defendant's fidu,eiary relar 
tionship. The Kentucky court further says that the party 
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practicing the deception ,cannot say t1o the party de-
ceived ''You ought not to havH believed or trusted me'' 
or that ''You yourself were guilty of negligence.'' 
It is quite signifieant in this case that the defendant 
in the face of all the evidence now known to her is still 
insisting on keeping Austin's property and that she has 
even gone to the lengths of saying that even if she w~as 
wrong she still is. entitled to keep it and that there is no 
court that can take away from her this ill-gotten pro-
perty. She still refus:es to make any effort to fulfill her 
fiduciary obligations but is insisting with every me~ans 
at her command that she keept Austin from getting what 
his father willed him. She and her witnesses made no 
~atte1npt to aid the court. Their whole effort even now 
is to withhold from the plaintiff his inheritance. 
It is. respectfully submitted that defendant and the 
other heirs of David L. Rice should not be allowed to 
keep Austin Rice's property and that he should be de-
creed as appurtenant to his land the Tight to the flow of 
Davis Creek to be limited only while the water is on turns 
to 10 hours a week, from 7 o'clock Wednesday night to 
5 o'clock Thurs·day morning and that he he decreed the 
land as described in his amended petition-the land on 
which is located his barn and corral. To do less would 
he to permit the defendant to p~rofit not only by her own 
wrong but by her breach of trus:t as an officer of the 
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court. The plaintiff is entitled to prevail, and the case 
should be reversed and the trial court ordered to amend 
its findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree accord-
ingly. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SHIRLEY P. JONES, 
Attorney for Plailntiff 
'(}ffljd A ppe lZwnt. 
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